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THE BIRTH OF POLISH SOCIALISM

by Peter Brock

ON OCTOBER 30, 1835, 141 Polish ex-serf peasants, refugees in Portsmouth (England), announced the setting-up of an independent political organization based on the abolition of private property in the means of production and distribution. A week later six members of the gentry added their signatures to the document.¹ This marked not only the creation of the first Polish socialist organization, but also the first occasion in the history of Europe when a group with an uncompromisingly socialist program was established, drawing its membership overwhelmingly from the peasantry itself.

Lud Polski (The Polish People), as the new society called itself, was dissolved in 1846. But, in the second half of the century, three successive socialist organizations, all formed in exile, were to take on the traditional name; and finally, in November 1892, the founder of the fourth and last *Lud Polski*, Bolesław Limanowski, presided at the meeting in Paris at which the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), still existing today in exile, was brought into being. There is, therefore, a definite continuity between the earlier agrarian socialist émigrés and the modern Polish Socialist Movement.²

The *Grudziąz* Commune, as the Portsmouth section of *Lud Polski* was called, had not, however, sprung up over night. How did it happen, then, that Poland was the first country in Europe to produce a form of socialism acceptable to at least a small group of actual peasants? What were the steps which finally led these peasants to set up their socialist commune in a foreign land far from their native Poland?

The story goes back to the last days of the November Insurrection of

¹*Lud Polski w Emigracji, 1835-1846* (Jersey, 1854), pp. 3-6. This volume contains the organization's archives.

²Formerly neglected, increasing interest has recently been shown in *Lud Polski*, which is even claimed as a forerunner of the present régime in Poland. This, for instance, is what Polish school-children are now taught about the organization: "*Lud Polski* alone desired a Poland of the working masses. It wanted neither a feudal nor a capitalist Poland. In its vague dreams it foresaw the socialist Poland which we are building. That is why we respect and revere the memory of the peasant patriots and their association." Gryzelda Missalowa and Janina Schoenbrenner, *Historia Polski* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 151.

1830-31. Many thousands of the Polish Army, under General Maciej Rybiński, were then forced to cross the Prussian frontier, where they were interned. The officers were separated from the men; and the Prussian authorities, backed by some of the higher Polish officers, made every effort to force the troops to accept the Tsar's amnesty and return to the Congress Kingdom. Those among the rank and file who refused to yield were employed under penal conditions to build fortifications around Danzig, Fischau and Grudziądz. The contrast between their treatment and that of their officers, whose captivity was light, aroused much resentment among the men, the first beginnings of a class consciousness. Their bitter experiences during this period made indeed an indelible impression on the future members of *Lud Polski*.

At the end of two years the Prussian authorities, not wishing to keep the Polish soldiers indefinitely, but unwilling to allow them to emigrate as they wished to France, where they could most easily engage in political or military activities, packed over 600 of them on board three ships bound for America. After some days, a storm arose which drove the ships to take shelter in port: the *Elisabeth* at Le Havre, the *Union* at Harwich and the *Marianne* at Portsmouth. The men in the *Elisabeth* and the *Union*, unwilling to continue their voyage to America, fell in with the proposal emanating from Prince Adam Czartoryski and his supporters to join the Foreign Legion in Algeria. But those on the *Marianne* in Portsmouth, evidently men of considerable independence of mind, refused either to resume their voyage or to agree to the Algerian proposals.³

Though the *Marianne* arrived in Portsmouth in December 1833, it was not until February 14, 1834, that the Poles finally obtained permission to land. According to their own account, they then numbered 212, of whom twelve were non-commissioned officers. They were mainly Poles, with a sprinkling of Ruthenians and Lithuanians; there appear, too, to have been a few minor gentry (*Szlachta Zagrodowa*) and small craftsmen among the overwhelmingly peasant majority. Many, however, were to leave Portsmouth during the twenty months before the foundation of *Lud Polski*.⁴

Already, before their disembarkation, at least two of the rival émigré camps had begun to try to enlist the peasant soldiers for their cause. Czartoryski urged them to join the Foreign Legion in Algiers, which would have won the approval of the French Government. "No one who cares for our country's good [he was writing on 8 February] can give you any other

³Stanisław Szpotański, *Początki polskiego socjalizmu*, (Warsaw, 1907), pp. 11, 12, and "Emigracja polska w Anglii (1831-1848)," *Biblioteka Warszawska* (1909), pp. 547-49; Czesław Wycech, *Z przeszłości ruchów chłopskich* (Warsaw, 1952), pp. 42-44; Adam Ciołkosz, "Było to w Portsmouth: Pierwsi socjaliści polscy," *Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanji* (London, October 1948). (Unfortunately a copy of St. Szpotański, *Lud Polski - Z dziejów polskiej myśli socjalistycznej* (Lwów, 1907) has not been accessible to me during the preparation of this article.)

⁴*L. P. w E.*, pp. 5, 6, 347, 355; *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (Paris, 1835) II, p. 361; *Portsmouth Herald*, 26 I, 15 II 1834; Ciołkosz, *op. cit.* The figures given by contemporaries are often contradictory.

advice In our present position we ought not to forget that we have not many places to choose where we can both find a refuge and profitably and actively await better times." Even General Dwernicki, then head of the centrist *Komitet Emigracji Polskiej*, though remaining in principle opposed to Polish participation in such ventures, felt that their joining the Foreign Legion was preferable to emigration to America.

But the peasant soldiers stoutly resisted all such offers. They had no intention, they stated, either of shedding their blood in the cause of a monarch whom they suspected of entertaining friendly feelings towards the oppressors of their country, or of helping to kill men with whom they, as Poles, had no quarrel. The entreaties of Lord Dudley Stuart, the leading spirit behind the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland, who argued that their remaining in England might influence the British Government against granting monetary aid to the Polish refugees already resident in the country and prejudice the population against their fellow exiles, were also unavailing. The soldiers, having successfully prevented the Prussian captain of their ship from weighing anchor, eventually remained in Portsmouth.⁵

A relief committee was soon formed among local sympathizers; the authorities were persuaded to give the use of some buildings in Portsea, formerly used as a hospital; and the Quakers, including the novelist Mrs. Amelia Opie, as well as the famous Harriet Martineau, and the Literary Association itself, all became interested in the Poles' plight.

Only two officers had accompanied them on their voyage: Major Wincenty Nowicki, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, and Second Lieutenant Taszycki, who were both supporters of Czartoryski. A third officer, Captain Franciszek Stawiarski, resident at the time in England, appears from the beginning to have tried to act as the men's mentor and guide. The illiterate peasant-soldiers, at first entirely ignorant of the English language, were indeed very much at the mercy of their superiors.⁶ The figure of Stawiarski is rather an enigmatic one. Lewak calls him an emissary of the Polish Democratic Society; while, on the other hand, Szpotański considers that he acted at first as an agent of Czartoryski.⁷ It seems most probable that in actual fact he represented Dwernicki's centre party, with whom the soldiers had gotten in contact soon after their disembarkation on February 23. Dwernicki issued an appeal "to the British Nation" asking for its support for the soldiers and he and his committee continued active in

⁵*L. P. w E.*, pp. 13, 17, 266. See also *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, II, p. 362.

⁶Lubomir Gadon, *Emigracja Polska* (Cracow, 1902), III, pp. 96-98; *L. P. w E.*, pp. 10, 13-16. Gadon states erroneously that it was a Lieutenant Seweryn Stawiarski and not Captain Franciszek S., also sometimes referred to as a lieutenant, who first took the Poles under his wing. There is also a complete discrepancy as to the position taken up by Major Nowicki. The soldiers claimed that he was in favor at first of their continuing to America and then of their accepting the Algerian proposal. (see *L. P. w E.*, pp. 265, 266). The Major, on the other hand, asserted that he was in agreement with his men in their refusal to move on. (See *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* [1835], II, p. 361.)

⁷Adam Lekak, "Czasy Wielkiej Emigracji," *"Polska, jej dzieje i kultura"*, (Warsaw), III, p. 219; Szpotański, *op. cit.*, p. 550.

collecting funds for them from the Poles in France. Indeed, Stawiarski's collaboration sometimes with the conservatives and at other times with the democrats may well be explained by the middle road which the General's committee followed.⁸

At first harmony reigned in the barracks among the former soldiers, still ruled with patriarchal benevolence by their officers. Their material needs were supplied by English sympathizers and through funds collected by Dwernicki's committee among the Poles; and in June the British Government granted a pension to all Polish émigrés then resident in England.

An English traveller passing through Portsmouth in August gives the following somewhat naive description of the conditions then prevailing in the "Polish Dépôt."

"They live in harmony with each other [he wrote], having elders at their head and officers of ménage—a semblance of a family. A penal code and an honorary tribunal is constituted by them for the maintenance of good order and discipline, and punishment is inflicted on the culprits . . . to the sound of their national songs, to drown the cries of the sufferer. This proves how anxious they are to preserve the honor of their country untarnished, and to render themselves by their orderly conduct not undeserving of the generosity of that nation which granted them an asylum and support. Some have found employment in the town and its vicinity during the harvest. All are panting after labor, and their employers bestow on them the praises of perseverance and dexterity. [The writer went on to remark on] the neat appearance of their clothes, and the respect they show to British officers when any one of them happens to pass by—a reverence which is left them from their old profession. Life in a camp has not impaired their moral feelings . . . every Sunday [they] proceed in knots to church."

Visitors from the conservatively inclined Literary Association and at least one Polish general had been given an enthusiastic welcome by the soldiers at their barracks.⁹

But the idyll was soon to be shattered by the arrival of representatives of the *Ogół*, the general organization of the Polish exiles in London, in which for a time democratic elements of various shades of opinion predominated. The *Ogół*, only founded in June, was indeed rent at this time by bitter conflict between a left wing under the influence of the reformed *carbonari* movement and led by Stanisław Worcell, Tadeusz Krępowiecki and Father Kazimierz Aleksander Pułaski, who, expelled first from France and then from Belgium, had reached England in the middle of 1834, and a right wing composed of followers of Young Poland (*Młoda Polska*) which had been formed in Switzerland under Mazzini's inspiration as a reaction against the cosmopolitan internationalism of the *carbonari*.

⁸L. P. w E., pp. 12, 136; *Portsmouth Herald*, 15 II, 14 VI 1834; *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle*, Portsmouth, 17 III 1834.

⁹*The Times* (London), 28 VIII 1834.

The disciples of Young Poland, most of whom had arrived in England in May after the unsuccessful expedition to Savoy, were supported, according to their opponents, by the conservatives under Professor Lach Szyrma. Politically, however, they were strongly republican and backed Dwernicki's efforts to unite the émigré democrats. The dispute reached a climax during August and September, when first the left and then the right got control of the *Ogół*. Finally, the radicals broke away and formed their own organization, the London *Gmina*.¹⁰

The emissaries delegated for work in Portsmouth were Father Wincenty Zienkiewicz, a Dr. Sobolewski, as well as Captain Stawiarski, who, as has been mentioned, was already in Portsmouth and active there among the peasant soldiers. The captain from the start appears indeed to have aroused suspicions in Major Nowicki as to the true object of his concern for the soldier's welfare. He was now joined by the priest and the doctor around the middle of August.¹¹ The exact political coloring of the emissaries' opinions is difficult to determine. The *Kronika* speaks of them as "emissaries of the London Club," the name given at first to the radical oppositionists led by Worcell, Krępowiecki and Pułaski, and less than 18 months later, the soldiers themselves say that Zienkiewicz first came to Portsmouth "with a recommendation from . . . the commission of the London *Ogół*, which was just at that time controlled by the radicals."¹² Possibly their political opinions had not yet completely crystallized. However, their later rivalry with the more extreme democrats for control over the Portsmouth soldiers seems to indicate that, if not from the very beginning, they soon came to side with the moderates.

The emissaries at once began to agitate in favor of their point of view, to organize the soldiers into an *Ogół* on the London model, and to incite them against Nowicki and Taszycki, whom they were even persuaded to summon before their court of honor. The soldiers had been filled with resentment at the disparity in the amounts of the grant made by the Government from June onwards to officers and to rank and file respectively. The blame for this was laid on Major Nowicki and the Literary Association.¹³ The latter, indeed, soon became perturbed by the turn events had

¹⁰See Bolesław Limanowski, *Stanisław Worcell* (Warsaw, 1948 edition) pp. 130-34; Hanna Pomorska, "Stanisław Worcell," *W stulecie Wiosny Ludów* (Warsaw, 1951), IV, pp. 34, 35; Witold Łukasiewicz, "Tadeusz Krępowiecki," *ibid.*, pp. 164-68; Szpotkański, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-86; *Krótki rys wypadków zaszłych w ogóle emigracji polskiej w Londynie* (Paris 1834), *passim*. The first three works contain much biographical detail concerning Worcell and Krępowiecki. Pułaski was an ex-piarist monk and a former vice-president of the Patriotic Society during the November insurrection. He died in Bedlam in 1838.

¹¹The emissaries' arrival must have taken place sometime between the visit to Portsmouth of the *Times*' correspondent and August 26, when the three signed in Portsmouth with the peasant soldiers the declaration, issued on July 29 under Dwernicki's inspiration by the Poitiers *Ogół*, stating that Czartoryski "not only does not possess their confidence but is considered as the enemy of the Polish emigration." This declaration was signed by 2840 exiles of various shades of democratic opinion. See *Akt z roku 1834 przeciw Adamowi Czartoryskiemu, wyobraźcielowi systemu polskiej arystokracji* (Poitiers, 1849), pp. 14, 28.

¹²*Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, I, pp. 342-45; II, pp. 363, 364; *L. P. w E.*, p. 17.

¹³*L. P. w E.*, p. 266. High-ranking officers and civilians were given three pounds

taken. "The model soldiers rechristened as citizens (wrote the organ of the Polish conservative camp) were changed out of all recognition." Nowicki, now bitterly hated by his subordinates, left for London on September 4, and neither the commission of investigation sent by the Literary Association nor the personal appeals of Lord Dudley Stuart were of any avail. The soldiers were now converted to the democratic faith.¹⁴

But their journey from democracy to socialism was to be a rough one. Their further political evolution, the final goal reached, was indeed the result of other influences, of their contact with even more radical elements of the emigration.

In the autumn of 1834, after the unsuccessful outcome of their attempt to obtain control of the London *Ogół*, over thirty members of the radical opposition had left the capital and settled on the island of Jersey. "Worcell (wrote Lelewel to his brother, Jan, on October 19) is going to Pułaski and Krepowiecki in Jersey where they have settled 30 of their people."¹⁵

Why had they chosen Jersey as their place of refuge from the storms of London émigré politics? Firstly, Jersey had a reputation as "a cheap place" where it would be easier "to eke out their scanty means." It would, therefore, serve well as a center for planning their future campaign of action. But a more important reason was that "several of them having friends in France . . . found the island very convenient for maintaining a correspondence with those friends."¹⁶ In other words, they could keep a closer contact with the centre of émigré political life in Paris and with the main bulk of their fellow exiles in France and act as a liaison between Polish democrats in France and in England.

Soon after their arrival on the island they had established there a section of the Polish Democratic Society which in March 1835 numbered 23 members.¹⁷ Quarrels, however, seem to have broken out immediately.¹⁸ Among the section's leading members were Worcell, who had previously been associated more with the democratic center, Seweryn Dziewicki, a participant in the attack on the Belweder Palace on November 29, 1830, and later in the unsuccessful Frankfurt and Savoy expeditions,¹⁹ Alexander

monthly, lesser officers two pounds, "subaltern officers" one pound eight shillings, and "common soldiers" only twenty-one shillings. The distribution of the grant was entrusted, until 1838, to the Literary Association. See *Accounts and Papers*, (London, 1850), XXXIII (27), Copies of Treasury Minutes, Papers and Reports respecting the Grants to Polish Refugees, pp. 581, 582, 585.

¹⁴*Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (1834), I, pp. 342-45, 364; II, pp. 40-48, 366.

¹⁵*Listy Joachima Lelewela. Oddział pierwszy. Listy do rodzeństwa pisane* (Poznań, 1879), II, pp. 55. The frequent assertion (e.g. Lewak, *op. cit.*, p. 219; Wycech, *op. cit.*, p. 44) that the peasant soldiers settled in Jersey as well as in Portsmouth is entirely without foundation.

¹⁶*The Jersey Argus and General Advertiser for the Channel Islands*, 23 VI 1835.

¹⁷*Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego* [Lithographed] (Poitiers), Lista członków T. D. P., 20 marca 1835, p. 6.

¹⁸*Listy emigracyjne Joachima Lelewela* (ed. Helena Więckowska), Cracow, 1948), I, p. 293.

¹⁹For Dziewicki, see Lewak's article in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Cracow, 1948), VI, p. 172; Marek Wajsblum, "Od Belwederu do Leominster", *Wiadomości* (London), 13, I 1952.

Gronkowski and Jan Kryński, later leading members of *Lud Polski*, Władysław Sabbatyn and Wincenty Zielanowicz. Three of the leaders who had belonged earlier to the Democratic Society—Krępowiecki himself, Zeno Świętosławski, future founder of the *Humani* Commune and the possessor of a private income which he was to put largely at the disposal of the common cause, and the somewhat elusive Father Pułaski—remained nominally outside the section, though their influence must always have been strongly felt.²⁰

Unfortunately, very little is known of the internal history of the Jersey group. This period was, however, to see the transformation of the majority of its members from left-wing republicans, vaguely inspired by the communistic principles of Babeuf's disciple, Buonarroti, and under the influence of the French utopian socialists, especially the St. Simonists and the christian socialist Buchez, into full-blooded communalists explicitly demanding the abolition of private property. At first they differed little in their political opinions from their opponents the moderate republicans, who had indeed denied, in the London *Ogół*, that the radicals were "apostles propagating some new system, a new kind of mission to liberate suffering humanity," since both sides shared the same political faith.²¹ The radicals entered the Democratic Society as a result of Buonarroti's instructions earlier in the year to the Polish members of the *carbonari* movement to infiltrate into this body;²² and it was only in the course of the next twelve months that they were to arrive at the formulation of their socialist doctrine, which was to appear in somewhat fragmentary and chaotic shape in the early manifestos of *Lud Polski*. But the steps by which they arrived at their full-fledged credo remain hidden.²³

How then were the links forged which were to connect this small and isolated group, composed of members of the intelligentsia, all of gentry or middle-class origin, with the peasant-soldiers of Portsmouth, and thereby lead to the creation of the first Polish socialist organization?

During the first half of September several of the extreme émigré democrats from London had passed through Portsmouth, visiting the barracks inhabited by the peasant-soldiers. One of their number—Wincenty Wierzbicki, a member of the Polish Democratic Society—happened suddenly to fall seriously ill and remained on in the barracks, cared for by the soldiers.²⁴ The visit, probably not accidental, coincided with a general

²⁰See *Okólniki T. D. P.*, *loc. cit.* For Sabbatyn and Zielanowicz, who were not to be associated later with *Lud Polski*, see J. N. Janowski, *Notaki Autobiograficzne, 1803-1853* (ed. Marian Tyrowicz), (Wrocław, 1950), pp. 254, 454-57.

²¹*Krótki rys*, pp. 12-18, 39.

²²Pomorska, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 35.

²³For the influence of the reformed *carbonari* and freemason movements and of French utopian socialism on the democratic wing of the Polish emigration in the period before the foundation of *Lud Polski*, see essays by G. Missalowa and W. Łukaszewicz in *W stulecie Wiosny Ludów*, III (1951).

²⁴The account given in *L. P. w E.* is extremely vague as to dating. But it speaks of these visitors as "from the London *Gmina*" (p. 16), which was only founded at the beginning of September (Limanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 132). Wierzbicki was certainly still resident

feeling of unrest among the soldiers. "At that time [they later relate] many of us had already begun to notice the abuses committed by [our] officers as a result of that state of dependence in which our ignorance of foreign languages had placed us." Though they failed to persuade their other visitors to remain, they invited them to come again themselves or at least to send others to help them with the necessary knowledge of foreign languages, men devoted to "the People and their principles."

During his convalescence Wierzbicki was able to make a number of converts in the barracks to the democratic creed. At the end of September the London *Ogół* was complaining of the radicals' "Machiavellian tendencies injecting our Portsmouth brothers with the poison of distrust . . . which has hitherto stood in the way of our political collaboration."²⁵ Wierzbicki's proselytizing zeal, too, naturally aroused opposition from Zienkiewicz, Stawiarski and Sobolewski, who, claiming a monopoly for their particular brand of democracy, looked with disfavor on the activities of a rival to their tutelage over the peasant-soldiers. At first they tried to get the latter to remove the sick man from their barracks. Since this request met with refusal, Dr. Sobolewski, who acted as the soldiers' medical adviser until his departure from Portsmouth a few months later, then confronted his patient with the alternative of either one or other of them leaving the town. This meant that the soldiers would be deprived either of their medical adviser or their political mentor. The matter was settled, however, by the arrival in Portsmouth from Jersey, probably sometime in November, of Seweryn Dziewicki, sent over by the group there to carry on political work among the peasant-soldiers. Wierzbicki could now retire to France to recuperate from his illness.

At first Dziewicki had to work in secrecy on account of "the continuing attraction which the words of the priest [Zienkiewicz] still held for some." Soon after his arrival he had, indeed, collaborated with Stawiarski in organizing a public meeting, held on November 29 to celebrate the outbreak of the recent insurrection and even wrote the latter's speech for him. But the soldiers had already been warned to avoid contact with Dziewicki, and Zienkiewicz and Stawiarski started up a campaign of slander against him.²⁶

The radicals likewise took up a most intolerant attitude toward all deviations from the simon-pure democratic creed. "The left [Dziewicki himself wrote in September to another émigré, Jan Bartkowski, of the split in the London *Ogół*] considered that any opinions contrary to democracy [i.e., as they understood it!] were merely those of traitors and could not be

in London on August 19 (*Akt przeciw Czartoryskiemu*, p. 26) and the fact that the *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* does not mention his arrival rather indicates that it took place after Major Nowicki's departure on September 4. He does not figure either among the list of members of the *Gmina* standing security for the loan from Reynolds, dated September 18 (*Krótki rys.* pp. 33, 34). His arrival in Portsmouth, therefore, probably occurred between September 3 and 18.

²⁵*Krótki rys.*, p. 40. The whole passage is obscure, since it might equally be taken to indicate that Stawiarski and Zienkiewicz were at that time working for the radicals.

²⁶*L. P. w E.*, pp. 15-17.

tolerated.”²⁷ It is, therefore, not surprising that the two sides could not long work together, and soon an open and bitter conflict was to break out for the political allegiance of the peasant-soldiers.

Before Wierzbicki left the country he and Dziewicki had formed themselves on November 25 into a section of the Democratic Society. But at first they had not been able to win the recognition of the Central Section, now at Poitiers, which did not approve of their secrecy and also claimed that every section must have at least five members in order to be in conformity with the society's regulations. In addition, Dziewicki's association with the Jersey section, already suspected of heresy, delayed recognition. However, the increased membership, which had risen to thirty-three by the middle of February 1835, and the decision taken on February 5 to carry on open activity under the name of the *Grudziąz* section, finally brought the grudging recognition of the Central Section.²⁸

Important changes had indeed been taking place within the Democratic Society, which were to mould its whole future. The society had arisen on March 17, 1832, as a break-away from Lelewel's centrist committee, and its founders were strongly under the influence of Buonarroti and the reformed *carbonari* movement. In their Act of Foundation (known too as the Little Manifesto) they therefore speak, when dealing with the agrarian problem, of “the land and its fruits, common to all.” Many of the original members were, however, soon to break with the Society, among them Krępowiecki, Pułaski and Świętosławski, all of whom were now in Jersey guiding from behind the scenes the activities of the society's recently formed section there.²⁹ In the middle of 1834 the whole society had acknowledged the Poitiers section as its central section, in place of Paris. This change had signified, first, the substitution of strong direction from the center—its enemies were to call it a dictatorship—in the place of the previous loose federation of sections which had made up the society; and, secondly, its complete isolation politically from the rest of the emigration, from the moderate democrats rightwards. It was accompanied, too, by a shifting of emphasis from the cosmopolitanism of the *carbonari* movement to a reliance above all on the strength of the Polish people itself. Finally, the new leadership put an end to the predominance of the vaguely communistic tendencies within the society: it marked the triumph of those members who demanded the recognition of the rights of individual private property and advocated their extension to peasant ownership. The man, indeed, who more than anyone else embodied the new way of thinking, was Wiktor Heltman.

Naturally, all this was regarded as anathema by the *carbonari* of the Jersey section. As early as November 25, 1834, thirteen members of the section had issued an Act which the Central Section, at whom its criticisms were aimed, considered as “disrespectful of the sovereignty (*wszechwładztwo*)

²⁷Szpotański, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

²⁸*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 342, p. 66; No. 457, p. 125.

²⁹Janowski, *O początku demokracji polskiej krótka wiadomość* (Paris, 1862), pp. 22-30.

within the Society." The rebels claimed, indeed, that the Society was now "different from what it had been when they first joined it." They considered, too, the transference of power from Paris to Poitiers an arbitrary act and deplored the decision to refuse all forms of political collaboration with other émigré organizations (*odrębne działanie*).

In reply, the Central Section argued that it had only acted in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of its members, and appealed for unity within the Society. Some sections, indeed, had already begun to call for energetic disciplinary action against the recalcitrants.

When in January 1833 the Central Section issued its proposals for reorganizing the Society's internal set-up, which would create a *Centralizacja* with very far-reaching authority over the membership, the Jersey section had objected to those clauses which, in its opinion, would curtail the freedom of action on the outside of the local sections. If such rules were accepted, the critics claimed, they would in the future make "the propaganda carried by us to Portsmouth" an impossibility. They would create a monopoly in favor of the Central Section and lead to a petrification of the activities of the local sections. In addition, Jersey accused Poitiers of aiming at a dictatorship over the membership, under cover of emergency powers. The Democratic Society, the Central Section answered sternly, must be united in its action and speak to the world with a single voice. The propagation of democratic principles was the executive's responsibility and not that of the individual sections. Otherwise, there would only be anarchy and confusion of principle.

But the thirteen remained unconvinced. On February 4 they accused the Central Section of violating the rights of man. They continued in their refusal to acknowledge the validity of its decisions in favor of isolated political action, and were still hoping to see the seat of authority within the Society return to the Paris section. At the beginning of March the Central Section, backed by the support of the other sections for strong measures, called on the thirteen to re-unite with the submissive minority of eight, which indeed had shortly before been recognized as the official section, even though it also was against the transference from Paris to Poitiers; and, as a condition of being received back into favor, the rebels were to withdraw their Act of November 25, the origin, it was claimed, of the whole controversy. If they continued in their opposition after the end of the month, added the Central Section, they would all be expelled. "Faithful to our decisions and viewpoint [replied the thirteen defiantly on March 18] we are far from making any concessions against our conscience; we are, indeed, under an obligation to defend the steps we have already taken and hence incapable of fulfilling conditions branded with the stigma of fear." On April 25, therefore, the Central Section took the final step of expelling those who remained firm in their opposition. The latter's action, it claimed, inspired by "anarchistic conceptions," had been tantamount to "rebellion

(*rokosz*)” against the properly constituted executive organ of the society, carrying out the will of the majority of its members.³⁰

Meanwhile, the germ of opposition had been carried by Dziewicki to the group which he had founded among the peasant-soldiers of Portsmouth. From the beginning, indeed, its ties were stronger with Jersey than with Poitiers. Its whole political and social philosophy had been accepted ready-made from the Jersey section. For instance, on December 10, 1835, replying to the gibe of the Avranches section of the Democratic Society that their opinions were merely the result of the intrigues of “the archpriests of the Jersey fraternity (*arcykapłani zakonu Jerseyjskiego*)” the peasant-soldiers readily acknowledged the source of their political ideas. “It is good indeed [they went on] to imitate what is great and splendid and solemn: the idea, for instance, of absolute equality and universal brotherhood.” “Who, if not the gentry [members of *Lud Polski*], have written all those pamphlets you have issued and accepted as your own without the least alteration?” Świętosławski, the only one of the original leaders to remain faithful throughout to the political partnership, was to inquire still later, in 1843, of the Portsmouth members in a moment of slight pique at their continued gullibility. It is clear, indeed, that even in this first period the Portsmouth section of the Democratic Society followed undeviatingly the leadership of Dziewicki and his sponsors in Jersey.³¹

The criticisms made by the Jersey section of the recent organizational changes, its opposition to the isolationist tactics of the Central Section, and its social gospel are all echoed in a message from Portsmouth to “the Polish democratic emigration,” dated February 20, 1835; and it is significant of the wide influence which Jersey already wielded among the peasant-soldiers that the address is sent in the name of some 200 members of the general organization (*Ogół*) and not merely in that of the smaller Democratic Society section.

“Neither [Dwernicki’s] committee nor the [Democratic] Society nor Young Poland is Poland itself [they wrote]. Poland is the whole democratic emigration, existing . . . by the principle of the absolute equality of men. We did not shed tears under the load of our hard labor at Grudziądz for the sake of Committee, Society or Young Poland, but for Poland. . . . The democratic emigration is the Polish people and whoever divides it becomes the murderer of the Polish people . . . the minute emigration societies must, therefore, humbly bow before it and acknowledge its supremacy.”

In March Dziewicki was joined in Portsmouth by Roch Rupniewski, a

³⁰*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 203, pp. 29 ff; No. 402, pp. 86-92; No. 457, pp. 119-25. Three of the rebels were not expelled at that time since they had shown themselves—at least temporarily—more amenable to the official line. Dziewicki, already in Portsmouth, had also signed the original Act. Cf. the version given by Janowski, who had joined the Central Section in April, in his *Notatki autobiograficzne*, pp. 486, 487, which possibly telescopes together the expulsion of the majority of the Jersey section and the suspension in membership of the Portsmouth section in the following year.

³¹*L. P. w E.*, pp. 23, 347; *Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 1090, p. 231. Cf. Szpotański, *op. cit.*, p. 551.

member of the Democratic Society's London section. Rupniewski had also taken part in the attack on the Belweder Palace and had been a member of the Society from its foundation. As well as their political work the two emissaries conducted a school among the soldier-peasants, who were almost all illiterate: "Men [they wrote of themselves] whom the monstrous laws of contemporary society have given over from the very cradle as slaves to the domination and arbitrary will of the privileged classes (*kasty*) who, appropriating all their time and labor for their own use, have not only prevented them from arriving at a knowledge of their inborn rights, but have even barred the way to the first elements of reading." The three R's, geography, a rudimentary acquaintance with French and English, social doctrine, and the history of Poland were the basis of this early experiment in adult education.³²

The success with which Dziewicki had been making recruits for the Democratic Society among the peasant-soldiers meant a corresponding decline in the influence of Zienkiewicz and Stawiarski, who were now clearly acting on behalf of Dwernicki's Committee. The Portsmouth section already had as many as 120 members by April, of whom about 75 had joined since the section came out into the open at the beginning of February.³³ According to several reports, all of a hostile character, the barracks since August of the previous year had been the scene of continuous political conflicts between supporters of the Democratic Society and of Dwernicki's Committee as well as of brawling, drunkenness and even immorality.³⁴ The priest and the captain had done their unsuccessful best to discourage the men from joining the Society.

On May 17 a final show-down took place at a meeting of the *Ogół* when Zienkiewicz and Stawiarski, who were accompanied by a visitor from France claiming to represent Dwernicki, tried to get a declaration in favor of the latter's committee. A general roughhouse ensued and the three were thrown out of the meeting. Since Stawiarski not only continued to agitate on behalf of Dwernicki, but also called in the aid of the police on account of the alleged assault against his person, the *Ogół* decided to expel him from membership.³⁵ This step marks the final ascendancy of the viewpoint represented by the Jersey "archpriests" and their emissaries in Portsmouth, a viewpoint which, however, was already regarded as heresy by the overwhelming majority of the Democratic Society as well as by its executive organ, the Central Section at Poitiers.

But it was not until the late spring of 1835 that the most deep-seated cause of the conflict between Jersey and Poitiers came out into the open.

³²*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1935), Lista członków, 20 marca, p. 7; No. 791, pp. 179-82, 191, 192; *L. P. w E.*, p. 16.

³³*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 457, p. 125; No. 590, pp. 130-32.

³⁴*Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, II, pp. 318, 349; Szpotkański, *op. cit.*, p. 549. The demoralization probably set in as much from continuous inactivity as from political disunity. See *Portsmouth Herald*, 26 VII 1834.

³⁵*L. P. w E.*, pp. 12, 13, 136.

The disputes over the internal organization of the society had in fact been of secondary importance compared to the irreconcilability of two opposing social philosophies: the island section's ardent espousal of the abolition of all private property and the viewpoint represented by the Central Section, the one which then prevailed among the majority of the society's members, standing squarely for the rights of individual ownership on the basis of work.⁸⁶

The fact that the socialists had won over the Portsmouth section, the largest section in the whole society and the only one made up almost exclusively of peasant members, made the situation still more serious for the Central Section. The delay in granting recognition had left a bad impression on the soldier-peasants, who had continued to defend the standpoint of the Jersey rebels even after their expulsion from the Society. "As for us [they stated on May 25] we shall renew both our friendship and the assurance of our co-operation with the members of the Jersey section, from whom the barriers erected by the society will not succeed in dividing us."

In their manifesto of May 6 the Portsmouth soldiers touched for the first time directly on the social problem. Their opinions, they declared, were "based on a deeply thought-out conception of socialism," compared to the superficial approach of the Central Section in such issues. In reply, the latter quoted Latin, and, "convinced that a mean exists between distrust and blind confidence," called for greater trust in their elected leaders on the part of the Portsmouth section.⁸⁷

On May 25, however, the Portsmouth section—or rather its political mentors, who were certainly responsible for the contents of the manifestos—came out with the full-fledged socialist doctrine in a defiant declaration of faith, which they proceeded to print and distribute throughout the Society. Attacking the Society's official line which advocated that the peasantry should be given full property rights to the land they cultivated, they denied the validity of private ownership in general.

"Every human being is born with the right to life [they declared]. . . . Is the right of property due to the influence of nature or of social institutions? Nature is the stepmother of property since there is no ownership in a state of nature. Sanctified by centuries of robbery, murder and plunder, the right of property is contrary to the right to life . . . it should, therefore, be overthrown, destroyed . . . just as the right to life is common to all, so is property a common right. . . . Individual ownership is the source of the existing social order and, if we do not have the courage to replace its conceptions with the idea of the socialization of property (*pojęcie własności społecznej*), it will for ever stand on guard over the People's slavery and act as the wet-nurse of the privileged classes."

The society was now advocating only "half-measures," temporary remedies which could not end the present division of society into two classes: the

⁸⁶Cf. Janowski, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁷*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 671, pp. 154-56; No. 791, pp. 181, 182, 185.

haves and the have-nots. It held back, too, from violent measures to overthrow the present social order for fear of offending the owners of property. But "the sword alone can be the beginning of happiness and the end of the martyrdom of Man." The way of peaceful persuasion, urged by the society's leaders in social questions, was simply playing the aristocracy's game.

The Democratic Society was, indeed, at this period faced with an uncomfortable dilemma when drawing up its social program. In the animated propaganda work it was to carry on for more than a decade in the home country, where it was successful in finding many converts to its general principles; it was forced to rely mainly on the support of the smaller landowners, who provided most of the conspirators. Its membership, too, among the exiles was predominantly of gentry origin. Politically radical, the leaders of the society had at the same time to be wary of showing any leniency towards social jacobinism, of any tendency towards inciting the peasantry to take violent action against the landowning class, if it wished to retain the support of such useful allies. Attacks on private property such as the Portsmouth section had made would, in the opinion of the Central Section, "put a weapon against the society into the hands of its numerous enemies, who intend to stir up the home country against it with accusations of anarchism and terrorism."³⁸

Poitiers was evidently by now under no illusion as to the inspiration of the Portsmouth section's declarations and the unity of action which existed between the peasant-soldiers and the members recently expelled from the Jersey section.³⁹

The Polish émigrés settled on the island, who had formed the original section now split in two, were, indeed, about this time going through a rather difficult period. Most of them had depended on the government grant, and when this expired in June 1835 they were left entirely without resources. "They solicit assistance more powerfully by their haggard and distressed appearance than by pertinacious applications," wrote the *Jersey Argus*, which commented, too, on the excellent character and dignified behaviour of the exiles.⁴⁰ On the initiative of Dr. Henri Brohier, a local friend and benefactor of the Polish exiles,⁴¹ a meeting was held on June 17, at which a Committee for the Assistance of the Polish Refugees was formed from influential islanders friendly to the Polish cause, for the purpose of organizing temporary relief for the needy, who numbered thirteen, indeed

³⁸*Ibid.*, No. 791, pp. 186, 187, 189-91.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴⁰*Jersey Argus*, 16 VI 1835. Files of the local press both in the British Museum and on the island itself are unfortunately defective.

⁴¹The doctor performed the remarkable feat of preserving the good-will of both conservative and democratic émigrés. In 1842, he was appointed Honorary Surgeon to the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland (*Report of the 26th Annual Meeting* (London, 1858)); he was nevertheless a personal friend of Worcell and was given a flattering obituary notice in *Demokrata Polski* (London), 24 III 1858. His funeral in January 1858 was attended by a special deputation of Poles then resident on the island. See also *Jersey Times*, 12 I 1858; *Chronique de Jersey*, 9/13 I 1858.

almost all those still remaining on the island. Two clergymen, two doctors, a baronet and other local worthies were chosen to sit on the Committee; and Worcell, Krępowiecki and Pułaski were co-opted to represent the Polish point of view. The attendance at the meeting had been poor but sufficient funds were raised to tide the refugees over the lean period until the British government finally approved a further annual grant. Perhaps the stress laid at the meeting on the fact that the Poles intended to leave the island as soon as possible may have touched a cord in the hearts of the Jerseymen.⁴²

But one section of the local community gave its unstinted support to the Polish exiles: the island radicals, who in this year had started up their own local paper, *The Jersey Argus*. The kinship between their political opinions soon made itself felt, even though some of the Poles' more fiery social tenets might perhaps have rather alarmed the very moderate radicalism of these Jerseymen, if they had fully realized their implications. The Liberty Club in St. Héliér, "a benefit association of artisans," had contributed over five pounds for the appeal and the *Argus* throughout gave the scheme its enthusiastic support. The *Argus*, too, devoted several editorials to the Polish cause, published poems dedicated to Poland, and continued to comment with sympathy and understanding on the exiles' plight and the fate of their country.

The Polish leaders were not slow in showing their appreciation. Worcell wrote to the editor on the day of the meeting itself to point out that their object was "to make the individual distress of the Polish refugees the means of bringing into notice the sacred rights of their country and the sanctity of [their] cause . . . to fulfill the mission imposed by our exile." The letter shows, too, the high hopes Worcell then entertained that the British people would force their government to take effective measures towards the restoration of Polish independence, illusions which over twenty years of untiring but ineffectual activity were finally to shatter. Now, however, Worcell was in an optimistic mood.

"At this present time [he wrote] there is less distance between the enlightened Pole and the English liberal than between the supporter of feudal institutions and the friend of the rights of the people in the same nation. To propagate this spirit of fraternity amongst nations is the principal object of our mission . . . the Polish refugees have found in this Island hearts which understood them; yes, the whole English nation is sincere in her affection for them. The time is fast approaching when the British Parliament will recognize their interests, and the crisis in which we now find ourselves is but transitory, and cannot avail against the sympathy of two nations, born to understand and assist each other."

The emphasis in Worcell's letter was still on a liberal internationalism of the Mazzini variety which was at that time gaining numerous adherents among the Polish democrats, rather than on the proletarian internationalism, which inspired the later manifestos of *Lud Polski*.

⁴²*Jersey Times*, 19 VI 1835; *Jersey Argus*, 23 VI 1835.

Even the more class-conscious Krępowiecki, writing on August 1 to express the gratitude of his fellow exiles—"the sons of Rational Liberty"—for the *Argus*' continued sympathy for their cause, stated that "it is the identity of your political principles with our own that we honour in you." But the socialism of the Jersey Poles and the Portsmouth peasants was far removed from the mild bourgeois radicalism of the *Argus*, taking Thomas Attwood and his recently dissolved Birmingham Political Union as its model.⁴³

It was also too radical, as has been seen, for the leaders of the Polish Democratic Society. In the first half of September the Central Section published a selection from the comments of the sections on the recent declarations of the Portsmouth group. The Vimoutiers section, for instance, in a well-argued statement claimed that only the promise of the property rights to their land would enlist the support of the Polish peasantry in the forthcoming insurrection. The landless were to be endowed with land from state property. They considered, moreover, that the advocates of common ownership sacrificed the present prosperity of the majority to the problematic future happiness of the whole community. The Mont de Marsan section, while generally supporting the Central Section's standpoint, regarded the dispute as "an unnecessary [one] and leading to no satisfactory outcome." Another section, at Laval, again quoted the home-country as likely to be against common ownership and the use of force to bring about social reform. The Montpellier section objected to the sarcastic and abusive terms in which Portsmouth couched its manifestos. While approving in principle of private ownership this section perhaps approached nearest to the position taken up by Portsmouth. "It will depend on the Polish People and the needs of the time [they stated] whether [property] should be individual or belong to the whole or a part of society." The section at Avranches, on the other hand, was for very strong measures against the heretics. "Absurd notions about property," "the aping of French terrorism on Polish soil," "anarchic conceptions on social matters": all this was the result of the intrigues of the Jersey socialists. This section had even sent to Portsmouth a special emissary, Major Pasierbski, a friend of one of the most influential opponents of socialism in the Central Section, J. N. Janowski, who, according to the peasant soldiers, mixed more with Stawiarski than with themselves, thus indicating that the captain and the priest, as they were later to claim, may actually have had some connection at this time with the Democratic Society. The Honfleur section, indeed, despite its agreement with the Central Section, advised postponement of the property issue. The section at Fontainebleau, however, considered that Portsmouth's attitude on the means of establishing the new social order was tantamount to a call to commit murder; and there appears, indeed, to have been general disapproval of its advocacy of terrorism as a political weapon. At least nine more sections sent in comments condemning the whole Portsmouth atti-

⁴³*Jersey Argus*, 1835, 30 VI; 7 VII; 14 VII; 11 VIII; 18 VIII; 12 IV 1836.

tude. "No one has come forward in their defence [wrote the Central Section]; their theories about common ownership, which belong to the category of those constantly recurring utopias, have not found any sympathy in the society."

The Central Section was, indeed, ready to grant that the subject of property relations was "the most urgent of social questions." But, if common ownership were instituted, it asked, would not differences soon creep in? Was it not, besides, an injustice to give equal rewards to unequal capacities and unequal amounts of labor performed? It was the reform of property relations and not the abolition of property that was needed, an increased number of property owners and not their total liquidation as a class. Approximate equality of ownership could be brought about by the division (*rozdrobnienie*) of large estates and the introduction of a progressive income tax; and, together with political equality, this could bring happiness to all the countries of Europe. Property did not destroy the good life, as the Portsmouth section claimed; it insured "independence; without it man would be . . . but a pure automaton, a machine, an instrument." Knowing the Jersey and Portsmouth sections' admiration for Robespierre, the Central Section reminded them that even the great Frenchman believed in private property. "Surely it is not possible to go further to-day than Robespierre himself went?" Thus it concluded its defence of private property against the socialist critics.⁴⁴

This point of view was to find final expression in the Great Manifesto of December 4, 1836.⁴⁵ But the fact that four sections in France as well as London and Portsmouth had protested against the expulsion in May of the eleven Jersey members, shows, indeed, that the critics were not without some support within the society's ranks.⁴⁶

The final break was not long in coming. On October 30 the Portsmouth section transformed itself into an independent commune, part of a projected larger organization, *Lud Polski*. While it still retained its former name of *Grudziąż*, all affiliation with the Democratic Society was now definitely renounced, though Stawiański and Zienkiewicz evidently still had some followers in the barracks.⁴⁷ The new organization in its first manifesto to the Polish emigration stood unreservedly for the abolition of private property, for complete equality in all things; and it was for its alleged betrayal of this principle that the Democratic Society was condemned.⁴⁸

The eleven Jersey members expelled from the Society had previously

⁴⁴*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1835), No. 1090, pp. 215-40. For the Portsmouth section's replies written after the setting-up of *Lud Polski*, see *L. P. w E.*, pp. 21-32.

⁴⁵Czesław Leśniewski, *Manifest Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego r. 1836* (Warsaw, 1936), p. 82.

⁴⁶*Okólniki T. D. P.*, loc. cit. p. 241.

⁴⁷They had at least 37 supporters at this date and 26 more followed in the middle of 1836. Stawiański continued to support Dwernicki, joining in 1836 his short-lived Confederation of the Polish Nation. Zienkiewicz turns up again in the forties as a follower of J. B. Ostrowski. See *L. P. w E.*, p. 12; Limanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 219; Leonard Rac, "Konfederacja Narodu Polskiego" (II), *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw, 1935), XXXIII, p. 114.

⁴⁸*L. P. w E.*, pp. 3-5.

issued on August 11 a statement declaring their full support for the Portsmouth section in its continued stand in favor of the abolition of private property.⁴⁹ Krępowiecki and Worcell evidently came over from Jersey to join Dziewicki and Rupniewski in their political work in Portsmouth only a few weeks before the formal creation of *Lud Polski*.⁵⁰ It is to the two latter, therefore, that the main credit is due for the conversion of the peasant-soldiers to the socialist creed.

On November 6 those of their sponsors from the educated classes, who were then resident in Portsmouth, declared their adherence to its program. "We hereby merge ourselves in this People [they wrote] in this social unity which we consider as the foundation stone of national strength in external affairs and, within the country, as a prerequisite for the preservation of absolute equality."⁵¹ Some four months later, those who had remained in Jersey under Świętosławski's leadership formed the *Humań* Commune, which at once affiliated with the commune in Portsmouth.⁵² The communes had also a number of adherents among the Polish democrats in London and a few scattered individual sympathizers on the continent.⁵³

Even the *Centralizacja* (as the Democratic Society's executive organ was to be styled from the end of January 1836 onwards) was reluctant to take strong measures against its most numerous section—and the most democratic in the social origin of its members—and for some months it took no action, hoping no doubt to be able eventually to rescue the peasant-soldiers from the machinations of the Jersey "archpriests." In March 1836 it merely suspended them in membership; and this decision was approved at the beginning of May by an overwhelming majority of 557 members of the society. Though 98 members demanded outright expulsion, 28 on the other hand voted against even suspension on the grounds that "it was still possible by way of persuasion to restrain [them] from schism, and incline them to respect the society's principles."⁵⁴

But this was purely wishful thinking. *Lud Polski*, from the very beginning, had not hidden its belief that there could be no compromise between its principles and those of the gentry-dominated democracy of the

⁴⁹*Okólniki T. D. P.*, loc. cit.; Witold Narkiewicz-Jodko, "Historia i system socjalizmu utopijnego wśród emigracji polskiej, 1834-46," *Polski socjalizm utopijny na emigracji* (Cracow, n. d.) p. 13. This declaration was printed in Portsmouth and a hundred copies sent for distribution among the Democratic Society's sections in France. These appear to have been confiscated by the Central Section at Poitiers. See *L. P. w E.*, pp. 8, 32, 33.

⁵⁰Krępowiecki was still in Jersey at the beginning of October and Worcell and Pułaski at the end of July. (*Jersey Argus*, 1835, 21 VII; 6 X.) Limanowski, *op cit.*, pp. 139, 140, therefore, antedates Krępowiecki's arrival in Portsmouth by almost a year. At some unspecified date, Recess Watróbka was to come from London and Gronkowski from Jersey. Pułaski, however, broke about this time with his colleagues and was later to join Ostrowski's centrist group in London. ([Binder], *Diplomatische Geschichte der Polnischen Emigration* (Stuttgart, 1842), p. 136.) He therefore played no part in *Lud Polski*.

⁵¹*L. P. w E.*, p. 6.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 14. I hope to deal more fully elsewhere with Świętosławski and the *Humań* Commune.

⁵³In London, for instance, Erazm Żmichowski, brother of the famous poetess, Narcyza, was a signatory to some of their manifestos. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁴*Okólniki T. D. P.* (1836), No. 172, pp. 21-24; No. 338, pp. 46, 47; No. 540, p. 64.

society;⁵⁵ and a majority of the peasant-soldiers of Portsmouth was to remain loyal to the socialist creed of *Lud Polski* throughout its many crises until its final dissolution over ten years later.

It had taken only a few months to create class conscious socialists out of the illiterate and embittered serf peasants who arrived in Portsmouth at the end of 1833. Their socialism, however, despite the radical demands put forward, was inspired by deeply religious feelings, and imbued, too, with the prevalent utopianism of the first half of the nineteenth century.

The role of the peasant-soldiers had been a mainly passive one. It was the meeting and fusion of two forces that had led to the creation of *Lud Polski*: the coming together, on the one hand, of left-wing elements working in the spirit of the international socialism of the *carbonari* movement, men of gentry and middle-class birth, whom circumstances had temporarily brought together on the island of Jersey and, on the other hand, of the Polish peasants in Portsmouth, who represented an entirely new element in Polish political life, hitherto the exclusive monopoly of the gentry and upper middle class. The emissaries from Jersey at first carried on their propaganda in Portsmouth within the framework of the Democratic Society, since this body had until then been vaguely inspired with socialist ideas. The internal changes which were being carried through at this time by the more socially conservative wing of the Society soon led, however, to a definite condemnation of a socialist solution of the agrarian problem. An early break with the Jersey and Portsmouth radicals was, therefore, inevitable.

But the mission of the Jersey socialists had been further complicated by the presence of other agencies at work among the peasant-soldiers: followers of Czartoryski and Dwernicki competed for their allegiance. Their ready acceptance of socialist doctrines and their rejection of the overtures of the other émigré parties were due, above all, to their social origin, to the bitter experiences they had undergone during their Prussian captivity, and to a feeling of isolation inspired by the predominantly gentry extraction of their fellow exiles who controlled émigré politics. Socialism, agrarian socialism, had at last come face to face with the peasant.

LONDON, ENGLAND

⁵⁵*L. P. w E.*, pp. 3-5, 7, 8, 21-36, 57-63, 95-102.

PAUL DE LAGARDE AS CRITIC—A ROMANTIC PROTEST IN AN AGE OF REALISM

by Robert W. Lougee

The hitherto obscure Göttingen professor, Paul de Lagarde, has received passing but rather widespread attention in the writings on recent German history. An enigmatic figure, he was a conservative with a contempt for German Conservative politics, a deeply pious man who rejected Christianity on rational grounds, an anti-semitist who had a profound respect for the ancient Hebrews, and a German nationalist who turned against the architect of the German Empire. He proved an inspiration to such diverse figures as Troeltsch and Alfred Rosenberg and was denounced by such equally diverse figures as Nietzsche and Ritschl. This essay attempts to discover a pattern in Lagarde's thought, its source, and its significance as a basis of opposition to the age in which he lived.

I

Lagarde was born in Berlin in 1827. His mother died in childbirth, and as a lad he found no object for his love but his books and studies, which he pursued avidly from his early days. He was brought up by an unfeeling father who was rigid in his Lutheran orthodoxy and loyalty to the Prussian King.¹ In the March Revolution the young Lagarde reflected his conservative surroundings, and he proudly wore the black and white colors on his hat. In the following year, 1849, two events, the Prussian reaction and his matriculation in the University of Berlin, led to reorientation in his thinking, which presaged all that followed. Despite his Prussian conservatism Lagarde was deeply perturbed by the harshness of the reaction, and his revulsion at the persecution of Waldeck, the moderate leader of the constitutionalists, marked a turning point in his political thought.² Ever afterwards he eyed the state with suspicion and hostility and turned to the nation as the true vehicle of historical evolution and as the principal concern of the true conservative. At Berlin the same year he committed himself to the study of theology and oriental philology. The atmosphere at the University was permeated with Hegelianism, the church politics of the King, and the orthodoxy of Hengstenberg to whom he had been recommended. He speedily reacted to this environment and longed for a religion of personal experience rather than of confession (*Persönlichkeit nicht Bekenntnis*), a religion rooted in the people and the soil of the Fatherland (*mit Erdgeruch*). The

¹Anna de Lagarde, *Paul de Lagarde—Erinnerungen aus seinem Leben* (Göttingen, 1894), 9 ff. The family name was Bötticher. Lagarde took his name from an aunt to whom he felt closer than to his father.

²"The turning-point in my political and religious thinking came with the injustice done Waldeck." Paul de Lagarde to Anna de Lagarde (1860). In Anna de Lagarde, *op cit.*, p. 15.

year 1849 was thus decisive for both his political and religious thought, and indeed both ran as a single stream from then on.³

During the following years of study at Halle and of research in the British Museum in London, when he lived with the Prussian Ambassador, August Bunsen, he gradually defined his life's work, an exhaustively critical edition of the Septuagint which would "scientifically" show the means of God's Revelation to the ancient Hebrew Nation. In preparation for this task he acquired the use of an incredible array of ancient and oriental languages. From the early fifties he published a constant stream of texts, articles, and reviews involving nearly every Ancient Near Eastern language. But never did he feel ready to commence his great work. Arduous duties as a public school teacher in the *Luisenrealschule* in Berlin left him too little time, although he worked incessantly. Only when a royal stipend relieved him from his teaching in 1868, followed by the call to fill Ewald's chair at Göttingen in 1869, could work be pushed forward more rapidly. But Lagarde's remaining thirteen years did not suffice, and his death in 1891 forced him, as Wilamowitz-Moellendorf said, "to drop the arms which were just ready to bind up the sheaves of his life's work."⁴

Lagarde commenced his publicistic (*Publizistik*) in the fifties. He felt keenly the failure to achieve German unity, the humiliation at Olmütz, the vacillation of the king, and the sterility of the party of the *Kreuz-zeitung*. His opposition was not that of the liberal, for he was, as he styled himself, a radical conservative.⁵ In his two most significant essays of these years, *Konservativ* and *Über das Verhältnis des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion*, he expounded this position and showed how he would conserve the fundamental and historic by rebuilding the old German Empire and by reawakening the German capacity for the ideal and the spiritual. As a prerequisite for this utopia, he urged the germanization of the lands of the Danubian monarchy. These essays contain the elements of all his later thought. In the 'sixties his pen was kept busy with his scholarly work, but with the coming of the Empire he turned to a new and vigorous criticism of a society which he felt had abandoned virtually all of the values and ideals which were its proper heritage. He attacked the centralized and impersonal power state (*Über die gegenwärtige Lage des Deutschen Reichs*), the *Kulturkampf* (*Diagnose*), the curriculum and objectives of the gymnasium (*Zum Unterrichtsgesetze*), and liberalism (*Die graue Internationale*). He refined his concept of a national religion (*Die Religion der Zukunft*), offered a new role to the aristocracy (*Die Reorganisation des Adels*), and defined the objectives of a new conservative party (*Programm für die konservative Partei Preussens*). He examined the position of youth, financial policy, and propounded a fantastic plan for dissolving the religious

³Paul de Lagarde. "Über einige Berliner Theologen, und was von ihnen zu lernen ist," *Mitteilungen* (4 vols., Göttingen, 1887-1891), IV, 58-80.

⁴U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. *My Recollections, 1848-1919* (Trans. by G. Richards, London, 1930, p. 277).

⁵Paul de Lagarde, "Konservativ," *Deutsche Schriften* (München, 1924), pp. 12, 21.

communities. These writings he collected in his *Deutsche Schriften*, the first definitive edition of which appeared in 1886. Increasingly he considered his program for national regeneration and his biblical studies as twin efforts, for he felt that truth about God's revelation to earlier peoples would make easier discernment of God's purpose for the present. Lagarde's last publication, *Mitteilungen* (4 volumes, 1888-91), clearly reveals this tendency, for this extraordinary collection of miscellanea contains material ranging from interpretations of obscure ancient codices to a criticism of Frederick William III and Frederick William IV.

Lagarde cannot be closely identified with any party or counted in the ranks of anyone's circle of followers. He always led a scholarly, retiring life and rejected summarily the one suggestion in 1852 that he enter politics. In the course of his youth, however, a number of men left their mark upon him. As a young lad he was deeply impressed with the religious personality of Schleiermacher who frequently visited with the family, though he was more influenced by the *Reden* which he read in more mature years than by the man. Figures at court or their followers often gathered at Lagarde's home. At these gatherings he heard the ideas of the King, the Gerlachs, Radowitz, and others discussed, and he probably knew Radowitz quite well.⁶ Aversion to the omnipotent state and bureaucratic administration, hope for the strong personal leadership of a religiously-minded monarch, disdain for partisan division, the dream of a reborn German Empire, these views of Radowitz Lagarde reiterated throughout his writings. At the University of Berlin, Lagarde acquired much knowledge but little inspiration from his professors, with the exception of Friedrich Rückert, whose quiet, meticulous scholarship and undogmatic but earnest piety deeply impressed the young scholar and led to the most enduring and rich friendship which Lagarde ever formed.⁷ At Halle, Heinrich Leo whetted Lagarde's romantic interest in the medieval past, and August Tholuck, leader of the Mediating School, contributed to Lagarde's growing interest in biblical criticism. In England he was strongly impressed by the sense of responsibility displayed by the aristocracy and by the "könighaft" quality of the people. His writings tirelessly commended these "German" virtues to his own people.

Significant though these personal relationships were, the principal source of Lagarde's ideas was the writings of German idealism and romanticism which he read insatiably as a youth. Indeed, as he acknowledged,⁸ books were his earliest and greatest inspiration. He followed Fichte's concept of God not as an "absolutely realized substance," but as a "self-realizing world order" and accordingly saw divine spirit eternally unfolding in history. He followed Humboldt's valuation of the individual above state and nation and like Humboldt regarded the state and nation as merely provid-

⁶L. von Schemann, *Paul de Lagarde—Ein Lebens und Erinnerungsbild* (Leipzig und Hertenstein, 1920), p. 42.

⁷Lagarde, "Erinnerungen an Friedrich Rückert," *Mitteilungen*, II.

⁸Lagarde, "Vorbemerkungen zu meiner Ausgabe der Septuaginta (sic)," *Symmicta* (Göttingen, 1877), p. 138.

ing the means or locus for individual development and perfection. He followed Schleiermacher's teaching that religion is a thing of feeling and not of intellect, whence Lagarde's theology aimed at stimulating the moral and spiritual sensitivity of the nation as a prerequisite for religious experience.

Lagarde was most heavily indebted to Herder and Grimm. From Herder he learned a humanism which made man's development a fundamental cosmic process. Developing *humanitas* is a process of constant striving, re-birth, self-culture, which, however, proceeds within the framework of national development. For only in the community of the nation is there a sensitivity to elemental forces, and hence the opportunity for the perfecting and realization of human potentialities. Religious life, political life, and cultural life are one with national life and growth. All that Lagarde wrote turned upon this idea, and he besought the youth of Germany in whom he placed his hope not only to read Herder but to make Herder a part (*Stückchen*) of themselves.⁹ For Grimm he had the fascination of an impressionable youth. The old Hessian evoked in the young romantic a deep love for the German past, for the pristine and unadulterated elements of German culture. He read eagerly the pages of the *Teutonic Mythology* and discerned in ancient Teutonic culture, despite all its crudeness, a richness of life and a vibrant animation. As he leafed through the pages of Grimm we may suppose that he first drew the idyllic picture of a sterling, simple and pious folk and contrasted it with his contemporaries with their veneer of civilization and their eclectic and corrupted culture. Grimm, he wrote, is the great patriot of the Fatherland, and all other patriots must follow him.¹⁰

Lagarde was known in Germany and even abroad, especially in America,¹¹ but he gathered no school of followers about him and his influence, while persistent, was sporadic. Nietzsche read Lagarde's *Über das Verhältnis des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion* in 1862 and was moved to send it to Wagner.¹² Neither maintained much subsequent interest in Lagarde although Lagarde's idealistic neo-Christian nationalism provoked from Nietzsche the epithet "Vainglorious ass."¹³ The *Rembrandt-deutscher*, Julius Langbehn, visited Lagarde at Göttingen and was markedly influenced by this prophet of national regeneration, many of whose ideas are reexpressed in *Rembrandt als Erzieher*.¹⁴ Yet Langbehn's important

⁹Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage des Deutschen Reiches," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 182.

¹⁰Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, II, 89.

¹¹In 1893 the Lagarde Library at New York University was opened. It consisted of books and manuscripts from his private collection. Paul Haupt, eminent Semitic philologist at Johns Hopkins, and a friend of Lagarde, was instrumental in procuring the collection. Professor George Foote Moore of Andover Theological Seminary eulogized Lagarde at the opening ceremonies. Lagarde, also, was admired by Dr. John Driver, well known preacher in the People's Church in Chicago.

¹²Nietzsche to Wagner (April 18, 1873), in Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, ed., *The Nietzsche-Wagner Correspondence* (trans. by C. Kerr, London, 1922), p. 170.

¹³Nietzsche to Theodor Fritsch (March 29, 1887), in M. Nichols, *From Nietzsche down to Hitler* (London, 1938), p. 58.

¹⁴Julius Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (Weimar, 1922), pp. 1, 4, 5. See, also, Momme Nissen, *Der Rembrandt Deutsche* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1926), pp. 73, 118, 142.

concept of "*Niederdeutsch*" cannot be found in Lagarde who conceived the nation less in racial than in spiritual terms. Ernst Troeltsch, in dedicating volume II of his *Gesammelte Schriften* to Lagarde, acknowledged a debt to Lagarde's "essentially historical, not speculative conception of religion, his self-conscious religiosity and his broad view which saw religion, political circumstances, and the total conditions of life all related."¹⁵ The German Youth movement owed not a little to Lagarde's inspiration, and the journal *Freideutsche Jugend* echoed many of his ideas.¹⁶ In 1915 and 1916, when hope was still alive that a sterling product would emerge out of the crucible of war, a veritable Lagarde revival took place as men recalled his prophecy that the nation must be reborn or perish.¹⁷ Less worthy has been the influence of Lagarde on Nazi and pre-Nazi writers, such as Alfred Rosenberg and Chamberlain, who made liberal use of Lagarde's bombastic utterances and especially of the anti-semitic outbursts of his later years.

II

Fundamentally Lagarde's thought is a philosophy of history. History is a continuously developing, divinely ordained world order. Natural law valid for all times and places does not govern its progress, nor is history fortuitous, the catnip mouse of sportive fate. Nor again is the historical development dialectical. No absolute logic courses through the world.¹⁸ History is the work of the Divine. "Historical events are guided by Providence which gives them direction and purpose."¹⁹ In this way God transmits His truth to men, but "God is not yet finished with His revelation of truth through history." In each past age, "heathen, Jewish, Christian," God has offered men truth suited to their particular stage of development. So will it ever be and each successive age has the dual task of preserving continuity with the past and yet seeking to find in the flow of events God's new meanings for the present. Mankind, thus, grows—"for long is eternity and ample therein is the room to learn and to grow"—by faithfulness to the revelations of the past and sensitivity to the revelations of the present.²⁰

It follows that faithfulness to history is a moral obligation. Men must discover the genius of their epoch and express it in all their works. The

¹⁵E. Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften* II, (Tübingen, 1922), viii.

¹⁶See, for example, Christian Hermann, "Der Sinn der Freideutschen Jugend," *Freideutsche Jugend* (May, 1915), I, 92. See, also, Richard Braun, *Individualismus und Gemeinschaft in der deutschen Jugendbewegung* (Erlangen, 1929), p. 13.

¹⁷Paul Fischer, "Paul de Lagarde, ein Prophet des deutschen Volkes," *Die Christliche Welt*, Nos. 48, 49, 50 (Dec. 2-16, 1915). G. Dost, *Paul de Lagarde's National Religion* (Published as *Tat-Flugschriften*, No. 4, München, 1915). P. Friederich, *Paul de Lagarde und das Deutschland von Morgen* (Weimar, 1916).

¹⁸Lagarde was bitterly anti-Hegel. To logos he opposed ethos. Thrusts at Hegel occur throughout his writings. See "Drei Vorreden," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 95. *Mitteilungen*, III, 157; IV, 71. "Über die Klage, dass der deutschen Jugend der Idealismus fehle," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 432. "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 184.

¹⁹Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 78.

²⁰Paul de Lagarde to Anna de Lagarde (Summer, 1850) in Anna de Lagarde, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

great man, the hero, is he who is gifted with an "energetic living power" which enables him to penetrate the superfluities and externalities of the surrounding world and feel the pulse of the innate flow of being. Such a figure must first be "an heretic and a destroyer," not of the historical "soul" or the elemental "spirit" of a people which has evolved from the immemorial past, but of the encrustations on that soul or spirit in the form of inflexible institutions or rigid dogmas which obscure it and inhibit its contact with the divine.²¹

Moreover, faithfulness to history is a moral obligation because history is the moral order, the ethos. Man is thus an essential ingredient of the moral order, the bearer of its development. And what is the good? It lies in the process itself, it is man's "effort to become better," and in his "understanding that his own life and history must tend to the same high goal."²² For neither history nor morality can unfold in solitude, but only in the life of the community. Conscience, the basis and impulse of the individual's moral striving is defined by "the moral attitude of the community." Conscience is not a faculty or capacity as eating or drinking, but it "rests on the historically evolved conditions and stands under the spirit of the time."²³ The conscience of the community will be infallible only if the community is an organically articulated "Gemeinwesen." For "in the moral world we are not incidentally related to one another but related as members of an organism."²⁴ If a community lacks this organic organization it will fail to have an historically perceptive conscience. Lagarde opposed this ethical doctrine to the amorality of the age of pseudo-Darwinian notions of might makes right, of Nietzschean transvaluation of values, and of hope for escape from moral law through an ethical pragmatism which would reduce human action from the moral to the judicious. Lagarde cursed "the self-seeking man"²⁵ who could find comfort in such teachings, and ceaselessly cried for a reawakened sense of duty which he held his own views implied. By duty he meant not merely fitting oneself into the machine of the state for the greater military, political, and economic glory of the race, but a striving for the spiritual unity of the whole, a discerning and fulfilling of the common historical task of the whole community.

The community which is most natural and historical is the community of the nation. Indeed, nations are "divine institutions." They are not the chance products of the flow of events. They are "created,"²⁶ and serve as the peculiar medium of the Divine. What exactly did Lagarde conceive the nation to be? His concept was not one of blood, for he held that no pure blood may be found within any of the German lands. Yet,

"This impurity of blood is of little concern. No one doubts that Leib-

²¹Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," pp. 138, 173.

²²Lagarde, "Die Religion der Zukunft," *Deutsche Schriften*, pp. 251, 252.

²³Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 48.

²⁴Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 135.

²⁵Anna de Lagarde, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁶Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 78.

nitz and Lessing were good Germans, yet their names are Slavic. Kant's father immigrated from Scotland. Should we, therefore, call Kant no German?"²⁷

Nor did he agree with Arndt that the nation may be found "*soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt, und Gott im Himmel Lieder singt.*" For the Swiss must properly be distinguished from the Germans, since the former have had a long independent national history and strong national traditions, yet German is their official tongue and is widely spoken in Switzerland. Nationality lies rather in the will to cohere, to be spiritually one. To defend this ideal vigorously, as for example the Swiss did in their struggle against the Hapsburg, is to be a nation. The binding force which makes a nation is a holy thing. Lagarde found that his meaning had been expressed exactly by Goethe.

"What is holy? That which binds souls together, even though it bind them as lightly as rushes the wreath. What is the holiest? That which today and eternally more and more deeply feels the spirit and seeks an essential oneness."²⁸

A nation is fundamentally an ideal. It is imponderable for it has no mass, nor does it consist of the masses. It is the expression of "the aristocracy of spirit" which is the actualization of the highest ideal and spiritual potentialities of the folk. A community founded on material power or organized with the aim of material aggrandizement is no true national community and must fall in its turn to revolution or disintegration.²⁹ Lagarde thus sharply contrasted nation and *Machtstaat*, conceiving the one as organic, divinely inspired, and historically developed, the other as mechanical and artificially forged. His national idea relates him to Ranke rather than Treitschke or Mommsen.

The nation is "original," "creative," and "progressive" and these qualities suit its moral and historical role. By "originality," Lagarde meant timelessness. The nation, that is, the spiritual bond which makes the nation, is from age to age. It is the historical invariable, the absolute. Customs, thoughts, institutions will change, and rightly so, but the basic spirit which wills the nation to be one cannot change, else the nation would cease to exist. The foundation of the nation is in "original men . . . in the primitive folk, in the folk absolutely"³⁰—that is, not in the unspoiled folk of misty antiquity but in the unspoiled folk of the visible present. By "creativity," Lagarde meant that the nation is not simply the passive recipient of historical circumstance, but has the capacity to generate the new.

"It is customary to think of the oldest times as those of wild barbarians who according to need hunted, herded, or farmed. But these same bar-

²⁷Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 143.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 144.

²⁹Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, IV, 44.

³⁰Lagarde, "Die Religion der Zukunft," pp. 260, 278.

barians created the language and, thus, demonstrated their creative power."³¹

Each people must recognize and utilize its native ability to create and to grow for "how badly it goes for a people who do not grow in faithfulness to the power in themselves."³² By "progressiveness," Lagarde meant that the nation as a living thing cannot stand still, but must go on to new and higher stages in its life's development. He agreed with Fichte's test of a true nation, "whether an absolute primeness or originality is present, leading to freedom, continuing improvement, progress."³³ We should be faithful to the past, but we must never forget that "Our Fatherland, every Fatherland is where its future is."³⁴

However vital the nation, in the last analysis it is a means rather than an end in Lagarde's thought.

"Every member of a nation is more, or ought to be more, than simply a subordinate unit thereof . . . for humanity, nationality, clan, family, individual form a pyramid and its point (i.e., the individual) reaches far nearer the heavens than its base."³⁵

True individuality, a *Persönlichkeit*, in Lagarde's view is certainly not an atom, a mere irreducible particle, quantitatively but not qualitatively distinct from others.³⁶ Individuality is uniqueness, not difference for the sake of difference, but difference which is engendered by the completely self-conscious and sincere individual expressing his own nature, untrammelled by the will to conform to convention, prejudice, ideology. Lagarde proclaimed the autonomy of the individual.

His strong conception of individuality led him on occasion to an extreme position.

"Personal life over everything. Every substitute for personality is hateful to me. Politically, I am the most German, that is, the most individual of men. Systematic anarchy is the solution to the riddle . . ."³⁷

Lagarde's Prussian sense of order, his devotion to monarchy, his belief in aristocratic leadership, suggest that too much should not be read into this youthful declaration. Yet Lagarde never abandoned the thesis that the individual is both the efficient and the final cause in society. He expressed the same idea thirty-five years later in one of his last political essays. "Individuality is our task," he wrote and argued that all in the state which does not directly serve in the development of the individual soul is idle and must perish.³⁸

³¹Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, I, 70.

³²Anna de Lagarde, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

³³Lagarde, "Die Religion der Zukunft," p. 278.

³⁴Lagarde, "Über die Klage," p. 433.

³⁵Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," pp. 163, 164.

³⁶Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, I, 63.

³⁷Paul de Lagarde to Anna de Lagarde (March 17, 1853), Anna de Lagarde, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁸Lagarde, "Programm für die konservative Partei Preussens," *Deutsche Schriften*, pp. 423, 376.

The question may be raised as to the consistency of Lagarde's conception of the nation with his conception of the individual. If the nation is a creation and instrument of the Divine should it not have precedence over the individual? Actually, Lagarde did not look at the problem in this way. The nation is a functioning organism. The whole and the parts are in a relation of vital mutual dependence. The great task of history is to blend the unique and diversified into a perfect harmony.

"To develop humanity is not the task of history. Everyone, while recognizing the peculiar virtue of others, ought to be and do something unique. Similarly with the different nations. Thus can we come to the ideal of a harmonious choir of individually unique spirits."³⁹

Highly developed individuality, in Lagarde's view, is not a source of discord but a *sine qua non* of a healthy national life. For the ideal is not dull uniformity which would afford meager scope for the play of moral and historical forces, but the articulation of self-true individuals, who, each in his own way or through his own group, contribute to the whole.

What is the meaning of this pattern of thought for Lagarde's *Zeitkritik*? By way of recapitulation, Lagarde's thought may be expressed in two general propositions: (1) that God unfolds His Kingdom progressively in the course of history; (2) that this process takes place in the development of nations conceived as organically articulated individuals, each unique and yet sharing a strong moral sense of their common destiny within the nation. It follows that anything inconsistent with or not included in the predicate of the second proposition is inconsistent with or not included in the process described by the first proposition. That is, that whatever stands apart from, or is inconsistent with the nation, rightly conceived, is apart from or is inconsistent with the Kingdom of God. The real, the true, the good is that which has developed historically as an integral part of the national life. The unreal, the false, the evil is that which has been superimposed, the spurious, the rootless, the *fremde*. Whatever corrupts or mechanizes the individual, or neutralizes his individuality, or disrupts the moral integration of individuals tends to destroy the nation "rightly conceived" and is a thing of evil. This is the standard against which Lagarde measured life in the nineteenth century Germany and especially in the Empire of 1871.

III

Despite his romantic propensities and attachment to ideals, Lagarde really meant to be a very practical man. His essays were not devoted primarily to theoretical or philosophical argument, but rather to concrete problems which he felt urgently needed solution. Four characteristic tendencies of his *Zeitkritik* are expressed by the following paraphrases. The state is a usurping monster, the chief source of the nation's ills. Political life has failed to achieve the basic task of giving expression to the will of the nation. The modern economy is morally enervating and is reducing

³⁹Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, III, 20.

the individual to a stereotype. German culture has completely lost touch with the ideal. A closer examination of these propositions will illustrate Lagarde's application of his ideas to the concrete milieu.

The impersonal, absolute, territorial power state as it had developed in western Europe and especially in Germany appeared to Lagarde not only the antithesis of the nation, but indeed its destroyer. Prussia, as a territorial state, is a patchwork fashioned out of three unattached rags (*Fetzen*) of the days of the Great Elector. It grew in power, as the other German states did, when the Holy Roman Empire lost practical value. Prussia was a product of need, just as any state. But to fulfill a practical need is not to become sacrosanct or to acquire any metaphysical status. Nothing is more arbitrary than the boundaries of states which have neither spiritual nor ethical determinants and, therefore, can enclose no spiritual or ethical being.⁴⁰

The state, then, is not "Selbst-Zweck." It may be purposeful, but that purpose lies outside of itself. The state is to the nation as a tool or a machine to man, merely a means of getting something done.⁴¹ Germany has declined to the extent that it has adopted the "ungerman" principle that the state "is the highest form of human activity."⁴² For the state can have no special life and hence no ideal can be embodied in it.⁴³ The state, therefore, must not replace individual action which alone can embrace the ideal.

"It is clear that the state should take no action in a matter where individuals alone can act; rather only where a task requires organized effort. The state's right, its power, and its duty extend only as far as the requirements of the situation in which it may legitimately act."⁴⁴

Lagarde, thus, saw violence done to his ideal world order by the narrowly conservative, reactionary state of Frederick William III and Frederick William IV, and even more by the centralized state of Bismarck.

Not only had the state arrogantly assumed a position which, in Lagarde's view, could be justified neither historically nor morally, but the nation had developed no political life which could be set against the state. The nation had no effective means of self-expression. An alternative to submissive acceptance of Bismarckian statism was liberalism. But for Lagarde, the latter did not and could not solve the problem. Liberalism, he urged, is an international movement resting on abstract ideas and not upon historical conditions indigenous to a given nation. Moreover, it does not recognize the mutual relation of individual and nation or the spiritual quality of this relation. It does not understand the unique individual, for it analyzes society into undifferentiated atoms. The liberals "murder . . . the conscience and the capacity to conceive life as a whole, and thereby they

⁴⁰Lagarde, "Diagnose," *Deutsche Schriften*, pp. 103, 104.

⁴¹Lagarde, "Programm," p. 379. Lagarde also terms the state a "Notbehelf." "Diagnose," p. 104.

⁴²Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 141.

⁴³Lagarde, "Die Finanzpolitik Deutschlands," *Deutsche Schriften*, pp. 349, 340.

⁴⁴Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 75.

kill individuality." They are then no "friends of freedom" and in no position to serve the nation.⁴⁵

Parliamentarism as practised in the *Landtag* and *Reichstag* is "a great fraud." The will of the nation is not implemented in these bodies for it never comes to expression therein. The Prussian electoral law with its three class provisions is an injustice and absurdity, admitted even by the Chancellor. The imperial electoral law with its wider suffrage provides no more effective way for the nation to speak, for the inspired press and the demagogue in the streets, and the party leader and government pressure in the *Reichstag* prevent it. Parliamentarism is, in effect, dictatorship.⁴⁶ To Lagarde, German political institutions were a travesty of the nation's obligations to history, to the individual, and to itself.

Economic changes in the nineteenth century and their concomitant social effects likewise rudely contradicted his ideals. The solid and pious German peasant and artisan, he asserted, are being uprooted, their virtues withering away, and their historic mission as the sturdy base of the German nation no longer fulfilled. This is the effect of the industrialization which has not and cannot relieve the enervating poverty of a large section of the nation. The products of industry may satisfy vogue and fashion, but what really basic needs are thus provided for? "How much finery need a pious woman possess?" Industry can only destroy the moral character of the nation by stirring its material desires. It can only destroy the individual by setting him "to watch over a machine which year in and year out does no more than fold and gum an envelope, or bore a needle hole." "The heart cannot be satisfied with that kind of life, it must possess the whole . . . man must be the artist, not the mechanic."⁴⁷

Mechanization and atomization were not the only evils of the modern economy which Lagarde deplored. The paper kingdom of money and credit seemed to him equally disruptive of old ideals and of the sanctity of the individual and nation. "The five billion of the French indemnity, really unearned by the nation or its members," he wrote, "has brought only misfortune."⁴⁸ But the real evil lies on the Bourse, where "many Germans of middle and higher ranks (rather than contributing their talents and position to the life of the nation) make a business of speculation."⁴⁹ "The Zeus of this modern Parthenon is success." Its driving force is "egotism." How can the nation be happy, how can it fulfill its mission as the medium of divine revelation when "rubber, coal, and schnapps barons and princes of the Bourse are looked up to with the highest regard—these men whose passion it is to produce 'paper dividends'."⁵⁰

⁴⁵Lagarde, "Die Graue International," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 358 ff.

⁴⁶Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," pp. 136, 137, 139. See, also, "Die nächsten Pflichten deutscher Politik," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 469 ff.

⁴⁷Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," pp. 122, 124.

⁴⁸Lagarde, "Die graue Internationale," p. 358. "Die nächsten Pflichten," p. 444.

⁴⁹Lagarde, "Die nächsten Pflichten," p. 447.

⁵⁰Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 125.

Lagarde deplored with equal vigor the cultural life of the nation. Culture, he regarded not as an end in itself, but a means through which the higher ideal of national ethos could be achieved. Culture is the totality of material means, of skills and abilities, and of the penetrating insights which man has accumulated through the ages.⁵¹ It is the degree to which human potentialities have been developed and refined. National culture is a vital part of the national heritage, but it is not a religion, as some would make it, and cannot be appealed to against an existing religion.⁵² Lagarde found the *Kulturkampf* one of the most distressing signs of the times, for here culture was presented as the ideal to be defended against a dogmatic, ultra-montane religion. Rather, culture is a means toward evoking a deeper and more indigenous spiritual and moral life which can command the devotion of all.⁵³

The age misconstrues the meaning of culture, but even more flagrant is the abuse of the two great cultural institutions, the church and the school. The one should accumulate and augment the spiritual culture of the nation, the other the intellectual. "But, alas," cried Lagarde, "both have been corrupted and their corruption is the principal source of the woes of the nation."

The church has failed to retain its pristine sensitivity to the word of God as He gave it to the nations. The Catholic Church, by creating, and the Protestant Church, by retaining dogmas, have both failed in the task of sustaining simple piety and a mood of responsiveness and sensitivity to the divine will.⁵⁴ Moreover, the church by its divisions into mutually hostile camps, tends to destroy that organic national unity and harmony in which alone true spiritual life can thrive.⁵⁵ The officious interference of the state in ecclesiastical affairs has at best engendered religiosity (perfunctory observances) as in the time of Frederick William III and Frederick William IV,⁵⁶ and at worst made religion a political issue as in the *Kulturkampf*. What Germany must understand is that God can reign only through a spiritually inclined, harmoniously integrated people.

"Let the godly in each of us be vibrantly alive and all of us thereby closely joined; no one identical with another, yet not distinct from the others; growing daily in unselfish love as on the way upward to God one comes closer to the other, yet each way unique—then God will reign."⁵⁷

Only in this way can the nation achieve and maintain its highest potentialities for spiritual culture.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵²Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 89.

⁵³This thesis is developed in "Diagnose," p. 103. "Diagnose" opened his anti-Bismarck critique in the seventies and was prompted primarily by the *Kulturkampf*.

⁵⁴Lagarde, "Über die gegenwärtige Lage," p. 151. "Über das Verhältnis," pp. 47, 48, 70 ff.

⁵⁵Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 75 ff.

⁵⁶Lagarde, "Über einige Berliner Theologen," passim.

⁵⁷Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 90.

Lagarde found the source of the decline of German intellectual life in the system of education which failed to reach the individual *qua* individual and failed to inculcate any sense of the ideal. In the gymnasial system of "general education" which sought to implant "something about everything" he saw only three distinct results: "bad eyes, a yawning boredom with respect to everything in the past, and an incapacity to face the future."⁵⁸ The crowning defect is the state-imposed examinations. The aim is to pass the exams to achieve a civil service appointment, or become a "one year volunteer," or gain some other practical and concrete objective. The aim of education is not the growth of the individual or the articulation of society, but the hurdling of an obstacle.⁵⁹ The result is that "an ocean of commonplaceness has flooded the land" since preparation for a standard examination has tended to create a standard product.⁶⁰ The system of general education (*Allgemeine Bildung*) has failed in the basic task of inculcating the ideal. For, while affording a curriculum, at best practical and useful only to the small handful of students who were to become professional scholars, the gymnasium offers a deep inner experience of the meaning of the nation and of its moral and spiritual role to no one. General education may teach the specific German "form" of civilization, but it offers only the inert residue, not the spirit of culture.⁶¹

Lagarde labored to save the individual, to save the nation, to maintain a balance between the one and the many, and to convince his countrymen of the force of the ideal and the spiritual in history. In this work he labored almost alone in the Empire of Bismarck. Virtually the only striking parallel to Lagarde was Konstantin Frantz. Frantz, like Lagarde, held that German life was degenerate because of faithlessness to its history, lack of national solidarity, and the failure to follow the ideal in political and social life.

"True politics must not be dedicated to building up such an abstraction as the state, but it must offer each folk in each period the chance to develop that constitution which their historical development implies . . . There is one people especially who represent the absolute and whose political organization, when it is achieved, must absolutely exclude the state. This people is the German."⁶²

Frantz's *Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands*, published in 1865 between the two most active periods of Lagarde's publicistic, might well have been written in considerable part by Lagarde. Frantz argued that "the life forces of the nation" require the development "of the whole." The political and social organization must express the organic character of the folk. Every class, every stem, must be allowed to retain its peculiarities, yet be integrated

⁵⁸Lagarde, "Die graue Internationale," p. 365.

⁵⁹Lagarde, "Diagnose," p. 109.

⁶⁰Lagarde, "Noch einmal zum Unterrichtsgesetze," *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 310 ff.

⁶¹Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis," p. 85.

⁶²K. Frantz, *Grundzüge des Wahren und Wirklichen Absoluten Idealismus* quoted in E. Stamm, *Konstantin Frantz Schriften und Leben* (Heidelberg, 1907), p. 40. See also, p. 25 ff.

with the nation, and, hence, each class and stem will be able to make its peculiar contribution. These considerations led Frantz, as Lagarde, to condemn the Reaction as the product of vested, not national interests, to cast the princes and the nobility into a new dynamic role of national leadership,⁶³ and to champion not a centralized state but a federal empire which would preserve individual differences within the framework of the whole. In the seventies, Frantz, as Lagarde, launched a savage *Zeitkritik* which was directed against national liberalism and its lack of national character, against the controlled press ("*Phrasenmacherei*"),⁶⁴ against "monopoly" and lack of idealism in industry and commerce, and against many other practises and tendencies which were being condemned simultaneously by Lagarde.

Whether these men were cranks or prophets, it is clear that they represented a tradition of opposition which they were reexpressing in their own way in response to the peculiar problems of their time. German idealism had opposed to an irrational society of external sanctions and restraints, an order which would accord with the freedom and interest of the individual. Lagarde and Frantz opposed *Geist* to *Macht*. German humanism had opposed to philistinism, pedantry, and orthodoxy the concept of the fully developed man. Lagarde and Frantz opposed *Persönlichkeit* to molded mass-man. German romanticism opposed to the mechanical and the static, the organic and the growing. Lagarde and Frantz demanded that the spirit of the present catch the spirit of the past, but strive for the spirit of the future.

These men matured in the decade before the mid-century. The mood of realism which was transforming the older speculative idealism into the historical idealism of Ranke and Sybel, which was transforming the idealistic "German" liberalism of Stein and Dahlmann into the doctrinaire liberalism of the July Revolution, and the realism which was possessing the universities as "*Wissenschaft*" could not leave untouched the most confirmed idealists. Lagarde and Frantz accordingly, steeped in the spirit of idealistic opposition, turned to concrete problems of society and politics. For them publicistic replaced philosophy and poetry as a means of expression. They sought to make romantic idealism a basic force in national life, a political instrument, and in this form passed on their heritage to a later generation which was to distort it beyond recognition. None the less, much that these two critics said might well have been pondered by sober and practical men of the age of realism. For both Lagarde and Frantz perceived that a crisis in moral and human values was at hand, and the events of our time have proved the validity of this insight.

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⁶³K. Krantz, *Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1865), pp. 363-365. See, also, Chap. II, *passim*.

⁶⁴K. Frantz, *Abfertigung der Nationalliberalen Presse nebst einer höchst nöthigen Belehrung über den Ultramontanismus* (Leipzig, 1873), p. 9.

THE GOTTWALD ERA IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Ladislav Feierabend

THE GOTTWALD era (1948-1953) will be remembered as one of the most sinister periods in the history of the Czechs and Slovaks. A once genuinely democratic Czechoslovakia has been transformed into a Communist state. Law has been replaced by despotism, freedom by subservience, tolerance by aggression, and mutual understanding by social class hatred. Tears, curses, and lamentations now typify this once smiling, happy people. The standard of living, at one time among the highest in Central Europe, has been rapidly lowered to the Soviet level. Gottwald's Czechoslovakia bears no resemblance to Masaryk's country. Sovietization has progressed at a fast pace.

On the surface, the political sovietization of Czechoslovakia has not made great strides. The outwardly democratic constitution of 1948 is still in force. Czechoslovakia is the only country among the European captives that has not shaped its government entirely in the Soviet pattern. Communist-ruled Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland have done so. In Czechoslovakia the post of President of the People's Republic still exists. Several political parties are still allowed, and the National Front nominally governs the country, with representatives of all parties in the National Assembly and in the Council of Ministers. However, in both institutions the prevalence of the two Communist Parties (Czech and Slovak) was apparent during the end of Gottwald's era, as they held 80 per cent of the total membership in the Assembly and 84 per cent in the Council. The representatives of the non-Communists became mere puppets, or, better expressed, "stooges" of the Communist dictatorship. The inner political sovietization has been completed, and the concept of a government by the "Regenerated National Front" has become quite meaningless.

During Gottwald's life many new ministries for specialized economic activities were set up in accordance with the Stalinist Soviet pattern, among them a State Planning Office with the rank of a ministry. A Ministry of State Control was also introduced to act generally as a watchdog of the administration, to check on its efficiency, and, particularly, to investigate the political orthodoxy of officials, and to encourage and act upon complaints and denunciations by citizens.

Only Czechoslovaks have been in the government, but the ministries have been inundated with many Soviet advisers who have commanded and supervised their activities. These advisers were in hiding during the first years of Gottwald's era, but at its end they appeared publicly, speaking at various meetings together with the Czechoslovak ministers. This was an infallible sign that Czechoslovakia was, at least politically, firmly in the hands of the Soviet Union.

The Slánský trial offered additional irrefutable evidence of this fact.

The internal struggle within the party, the motives of which are not quite clear or unanimously agreed upon by the experts, was terminated victoriously for Gottwald and his clan, in exchange for an unrestricted subservience to Soviet orders. To the many theories put forward to explain the motives of the struggle within the party, I should like to add still another one which is less known: namely, that Slánský and Geminder sat in the Cominform as Zhdanov's nominees. The old Malenkov-Zhdanov struggle might have had a belated effect in the Prague trial.

The judiciary was completely changed according to the Soviet pattern during Gottwald's life. This was accomplished by a series of laws approved by the Parliament at the end of October 1952. The so-called "democratic centralization" does not differentiate between civic and military courts. There are only ordinary and extra-ordinary courts. The jurisdiction of extra-ordinary military courts has been extended to include civilians. Justice has been based upon the class struggle. Everything has been subordinated to the interests of the working class, which means in practice to the Communist Party. The new criminal law of Czechoslovakia is a mockery of all modern principles of justice. A public prosecutor can quash the ruling of a court if it conflicts with what he considers to be the state's interests.

Politically, the Soviet grip on Czechoslovakia was made firm during Gottwald's era. I do not want to compare it with the Soviet hold on other Central European captive states, but it is one of the firmest, if not the most firm. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union has been vitally interested in Czechoslovakia, because of the skill, knowledge, and experience of her people in heavy engineering industry. Czechoslovakia has become a technical brain for the Soviets, equal in importance to Eastern Germany.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to gamble on the reliability and obedience of the Czechoslovak Communist Parties, and since the Yugoslav experience the Soviets have done everything in their power to prevent any present or future deviation from the Kremlin line. Gottwald was very helpful in this respect, and his clan, which, despite Zapotocký's presidency, is still in control of the party, will act in the same direction. The Slánský trial was a warning to the Czechoslovak Communists that they must not dare to question the Kremlin policy, let alone to try to act against it. To quote the *Rudé Právo* of May 25, 1952: "Love of the Soviet Union does not tolerate the slightest reservation. The road into the morass of treason indeed begins on the inclined plane of reservations and doubts regarding the correctness of the policy of the Soviet Union." The Prague trial confirmed this in a most dramatic way and dispelled any possibility of Czechoslovakia's becoming a Titoist country. This was the significance of the trial. The Kremlin, not just Communism, has been firmly established in Czechoslovakia.

During Gottwald's life, Czechoslovak foreign policy continued to follow the Soviet lead. Stalin's sharp rebuke of Gottwald's approval of the Marshall

Plan for Czechoslovakia (July, 1947) taught him for the rest of his life that Soviet foreign policy must be Czechoslovakia's foreign policy.

Since that rebuke Czechoslovakia has been an independent country in name only. In fact, it has become a member of the Soviet Empire, with no more rights than any other member of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia's independence has become a matter of expediency for the Kremlin masters. These masters, although they have been changed since Gottwald's death, are not presently inclined, in my opinion, to change this status, as Czechoslovakia serves them better as a nominally sovereign state than as a republic incorporated into the Soviet Union.

The dependence of Czechoslovakia on the Soviets was clearly reflected in all internal affairs of the country during Gottwald's life.

The Czechoslovak Armed Forces, which used to be traditionally an army of the highest Western standards, both in regard to morale and to arms and equipment, has remained a Czechoslovak Army in name only. In reality it is nothing more than an auxiliary corps of the Soviet Army. Sovietization has progressed rapidly in every field, from political control to training. Politically, the command of the Czechoslovak Forces no longer rests with the Prague government, but entirely with Moscow. Prague acts merely as an obedient subordinate in carrying out Soviet orders.

Militarily, the Czechoslovak Forces have been reorganized on the pattern of the Soviet Army, they have the same organization, the same procedure in training, and they employ the same tactical theories. This reorganization has been carried to such a degree that all army manuals and regulations have been replaced by mere translations of the corresponding Russian books. Furloughs and leaves are no longer being granted in the Czechoslovak Army as a matter of course, but only as an exceptional reward for political loyalty to the governing oligarchy. Everything related to the army has been wrapped up in Eastern secrecy, even such matters as the rank of officers. Soldiers' mail, of course, is strictly censored.

As regards reorganization, the Ministry of Defense, no longer a controlling government agency, has become—after the Soviet pattern—a sort of peacetime high command. This is why the Minister of Defense, a civilian by profession, has been given the rank of full general—a far cry from the democratic principle that the armed forces should be under the control of a civilian cabinet minister.

Below the Ministry of Defense, the pattern is that of the Soviet Army, from the division of the country into two military zones down to the organization of the smallest unit. The hermetical closing of the state borders is maintained by the so-called "Frontier Guard" units, which are composed of men from the army who have been found more reliable, or perhaps less unreliable, than others. On the other hand, those men who have been found more than usually unreliable are no longer inducted into regular army units at all, but are sent, according to the Soviet system, to army labor battalions. They perform no military duties whatever, and are attached to

heavy industry, mines, or farms (collectives), depending on existing needs.

All weapons—aircraft, tanks, and infantry weapons—are manufactured according to Soviet models. An ever-increasing number of Soviet officers, who are attached to every level of command, are supervising training, organization, security, and political indoctrination, and they are the real masters of every unit. The Czechoslovak commanders, however carefully hand-picked Communists they may be, have become mere executors of the will of the Soviet officers. The new officers corps has been gradually trained and exclusively selected from sons of working-class people. It is in this area that Soviet infiltration is the most effective.

Economically, Czechoslovakia has become a workshop toiling for Soviet needs according to Soviet orders. The Soviet, not Czechoslovak, interests fixed the principal lines of the Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan for 1949 to 1953. The remarkable feature of the industrial plan is its emphasis on production of investment goods: whereas production of consumer goods, badly needed for a higher standard of living, is intentionally disregarded. Since the country had a very powerful heavy industry before World War II, this new emphasis is resulting in a dangerous over-industrialization, hardly conducive to a sound economy.

After February 1951 greater emphasis was placed on the expansion of heavy industry, particularly of heavy engineering industry. The output of heavy industry as a whole in 1953 is to be 230 per cent of the 1948 level, when it matched the pre-war figures. It cannot be proved directly, but it appears that the revised plan was approved during the conference of the Soviet rulers with representatives of the satellite governments and China, which was held in Moscow from the beginning of December 1949 to the end of February 1950, and at which the first steps were taken to establish the Soviet *Grossraum* economy.

The plan was prepared, according to some sources, by the Central Planning Office in Moscow, which allegedly has directed all economic life in all captive countries since 1950, and closely cooperates with the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), established as a counterpart to the Marshall Plan for Western Europe.

Czechoslovakia was ordered to open new mines for the production of low-rate iron ores, non-ferrous metal ores and pyrites, and to build new mills for the production of synthetic fibers and synthetic rubber. Many power stations and heavy engineering plants were established, with two enormous foundry units in Kunčice in Moravia, and near Košice in Slovakia. The close tie between Czechoslovak and Soviet Union economies is evidenced by the dependence of these enterprises on imported raw materials from the Soviet Union. The Kremlin has shifted the burden of rearmament to the captive countries, and Czechoslovakia, given a heavy share of the load, is expected to make delivery of many important items. The dependence of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet Union has gone so far as to allow the function-

ing of the economic machine to be directed to serve Soviet needs, rather than her own.

The changed Soviet Plan must inevitably result in the exhaustion of domestic economic resources, and numerous disproportions are bound to appear when heavy industry is developed at such a pace. The new goals prescribed by the Plan have been too excessive to be achieved with normal human effort, and thus many gaps appear daily to hinder the fulfillment of the Plan. Gottwald's régime concentrated upon filling these gaps, with the result that new ones appeared the next day.

Besides a shortage of power and raw materials, the shortage of labor represents the basic factor behind these difficulties. The over-industrialized Czechoslovakia today has 15 per cent less inhabitants than the industrialized Czechoslovakia before World War II. Natural increment of population cannot supply the necessary labor force required for the increase of industries, although women and children have been encouraged to work, not only in heavy industry, but in mining as well. According to the report of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office on the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan for the third quarter of 1952, 34.6 per cent of the total labor force was provided by women, but the shortage still exists.

The only labor reserve available existed in agriculture; therefore a ruthless collectivization drive was carried out to supply the labor force with the excess agricultural population. With the exception of the Baltic States, in no country of Central Europe has the collectivization of land been carried out at such a pace as in Czechoslovakia. It began in the fall of 1949, and according to latest reports,¹ 2,598,073 hectares of agricultural land were collectivized by the end of 1952. If we did add the area of the state estates to this total, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land was controlled by the socialistic sector of agriculture by the end of 1952.

The Communists have to squeeze out of agriculture every available man and woman, and few are left to obtain, as, in my estimation, in the Czech provinces of the Republic the agricultural population represents barely 20 percent of the total population. For this reason during Gottwald's régime the ruthless class struggle was instigated against wealthy peasants and anyone opposed to collectivization. The "village rich," or *Kulaks*, had to be disposed of as soon as possible, so they were sent to work in mines or in heavy industry, if not to prison or forced labor camps. The collectivization was carried out so hastily that the plowing-up of boundaries had priority over the plowing of ground. The gathering of a very bad crop of potatoes and sugar beets in the fall of 1952 was delayed because of the disorganization caused by a rapid growth of the new production cooperatives. The Communists boasted that over half a million hectares were collectivized during the three months following the harvest, and that 50 per cent of Slovak agricultural soil was in the socialistic sector of agriculture.

¹*Pod zástavou socialismu*, April 1953, p. 495.

Consequences of the rapid collectivization have been disastrous. During 1952 the agricultural production was so far below the goals of the Plan that the Communists, except in a few instances, did not dare to publish even the percentages of fulfillment. According to the Plan, in 1952 the agricultural production should have been 25 per cent higher than in 1938, but on the average the pre-war figures were not reached. This statement is based on a very careful analysis of the Communist data at my disposal, and is not merely my own estimate. In animal production, the core of the agricultural Five-Year Plan, the pre-war level has been attained only in the production of pork.

It would seem from this unrealistic agricultural policy that the Soviets are not interested in Czechoslovak agricultural output. For the time being Russia is willing to supply the lacking foodstuffs, as this is the easiest and cheapest way to pay for the Czechoslovak deliveries to the Soviet Union. Russia wants Czechoslovakia to transfer as many agricultural people as possible to industry, for the production of precision tools, machines, and armaments is of prime importance to the Soviets.

Czechoslovakia's great dependence on the Soviet Union is clearly indicated by the Czechoslovak foreign trade, an achievement of Gottwald's era. In 1952 nearly 75 per cent of the trade was with the Soviet Union and with the other people's democracies. Fifty per cent of the population is nourished by Soviet imports, whereas before the war only one out of ten people was dependent upon imported foodstuffs. Every year about one million tons of cereals are imported from the Soviet Union. Gottwald himself stated on January 1, 1952, that 20 times as much grain for bread, and 26 times as much fats were imported in 1951 than before the war, and that over 41,000 tons of meat were imported the same year. In 1938, although more highly populated, Czechoslovakia was self-sufficient in meat production.

Soviet control of the country's standard of living is another achievement of the Gottwald era. The lowering of standards to the Soviet level was one of the aims of the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, a very unpopular task indeed for Gottwald's régime, but one fulfilled without hesitation to please the Kremlin.

This lowering of the standard of living has brought about general dissatisfaction and a lessening of labor efficiency. It has been the cause of enormous labor fluctuation and absenteeism, which averaged 20 per cent of the labor force in 1952, according to official Communist pronouncements. Finance Minister J. Kabeš, introducing his 1953 budget, complained that for enterprises under one industrial ministry, 5,500 new workers were inducted in 1952, but at the same time about 5,000 old workers left.

Gottwald forced people to work, and lowered the standard of working conditions and privileges. Workers have been deprived of all their former gains, and their trade unions have become state institutions. The reorganization of the URO (the Central Trade Union) in 1952 swept away all remaining traces of autonomy and transformed the Center to an instrument

of labor enforcement. Trade unions are not defending the workers' rights against the nationalized enterprises, but are forcing the workers to acquiesce in the requirements, however heavy and unjust, of the producing state machine. The carrying-out of the National Social Security scheme has been entrusted to the organization of trade unions along the Soviet pattern. Social Security has become a tool for the education of Stakhanovites, who raise the labor norms. The Czechoslovak worker has only one remaining right: to ask for more work and less pay. This is the essence of the Communist Stakhanovite movement.

Although working conditions went from bad to worse during Gottwald's era, the workers remained passive because of the threat of police action. Punishment for absenteeism, inefficiency, non-delivery of agricultural products, etc., is forced labor in Czechoslovakia's numerous concentration camps. Population transfers and deportations have been other means employed in the expansion and perfection of the system of forced labor which has become so important in what the Communist régimes call "the building of socialism."

At the same time, hunger has been applied as the most efficient means of forcing the people to work. The rationing system has been changed since the beginning of this year. Persons able to work, but not working, are simply getting no rations, and a political body, rather than a doctor, determines whether a person is able to work. All peasants owning more than one half hectare (one and a quarter acres) of land have been declared self-suppliers. Only joining a production cooperative can save them from starvation. All former capitalist elements, which in Communist terminology include craftsmen such as barbers, plumbers, etc., are deprived of rations if they are old and cannot work. They have to buy everything on the so-called "allowed free market," where the prices are several times higher than elsewhere, and goods are in scarce supply.

Gottwald's era favored the workers as producers, but hated them as consumers. Even working adults were not getting rations of milk, butter and eggs in the first months of 1953, as the supply was short. Coke was available for Darex dollars² only, and coal was valued like gold during the last winter. Electricity consumption has been strictly rationed—no heating with it is allowed—and any violation of its use results in the cutting off of current. All consumer goods are scarce, and if of better quality are very expensive. This has been the legacy of Gottwald's era to the consumers.

In cultural matters also, Czechoslovakia is totally in Soviet hands, with cultural policy being dictated by Moscow. All organized churches have been reduced to instruments of Kremlin policy. It was not very difficult to gain control over the different Protestant sects, the Jewish congregations, and other small church communities, but the Catholic Church, always a stronghold in Czechoslovakia, posed a greater problem. Gottwald's régime was

²Dollar remittances to Czechoslovakia sent through a Communist agency called "Darex," for the purchase of consumer goods.

not loath to use any means, including trials, concentration camps, prisons, and hanging, against those Catholic priests who were not willing to become servitors of the Politburo. The result has been that all churches, including the Catholic church, have been isolated from the outside world and forced to accept Communist guidance.

These revolutionary reversals are of infinitely greater significance than the disappearance of Archbishop Beran and the bad treatment of other dignitaries. Another of the "achievements" of Gottwald's era is the establishment of the Communist State as master of worship and of conscience over all believers.

It is interesting to note that the principles of the Zhdanov policy, which even today are adhered to by all artists and intellectuals in Soviet Russia, were not applied in Czechoslovakia during the end of Gottwald's era. Only the Soviet Communist Party, according to these principles, is capable of discerning the reality and truth in every situation, and, therefore, only the Party may issue directives and open new horizons to intellectual pursuits.

Moscow has been aware that Western influences have always been much stronger than Eastern in Czechoslovakia, and that what is not digestible to the Czech or Slovak artists or scholars can hardly be digestible to intellectuals in the free world. Czechoslovakia served the Soviets as a barometer of the attitude of leftist intellectuals in the West, although it seems that Czech standards can no longer be indicative of Western tastes. In any event, even this ostensibly non-Moscow policy was dictated by Moscow, and otherwise the sovietization of culture has been pursued systematically.

No book, pamphlet, or periodical, in fact, no publication can be printed without permission from the ministry charged with this task. Censorship has not existed on paper, but those publications not adhering to the Soviet line simply do not get any allocation of paper. All public libraries, including the six-hundred-year-old University Library in Prague, were closed for a time while special commissions purged them of books not tolerated by the régime. The line between what books were allowed and what were not was not fixed in Czechoslovakia, but by the education and publication department in the Cominform. Reading of the so-called "forbidden" books is punished as a crime of instigation, and in cases of domiciliary searches by the secret police, the library in the home is the first thing that is examined.

All private schools of music and dramatic art have been closed. Only those pupils who finish at the Academy or at conservatories of music and of dramatic arts operated by the state, may be engaged as actors by theaters which also belong to the state, community, or to public corporations. The same applies to musicians in orchestras. All private theater and concert agencies have been abolished, their function being carried out by a ministerial division which performs the political screening of artists.

What is required from an applicant to an academy of Dramatic Arts at the admission examination? First of all, a test of the applicant's know-

ledge of Marx-Lenin-Stalin theory and of the history of the Communist Party (if he fails in this subject he can never play in a theater, however extraordinary his talents may be), then a recital of a Czech or Slovak poem, and finally a performance of two scenes, one of a Czechoslovak and the other of a Russian play. The proletarian origin of an applicant is essential, as the composition of the examining commission is political. Two members of the present commission of the Prague Academy used to be ushers at concerts in Prague before the war.

Censorship of films has been exactly the same as that of books. The state is the only producer of films and the state alone may decide when and what foreign films are to be shown. On an average, 70 per cent of the films released are of Russian production, and 30 per cent of Czechoslovak production. Western films are shown only occasionally, as deterrents to a "capitalistic" way of life.

During the Gottwald era the school system was made to conform to the Soviet pattern. The basic organization of uniform education for all children up to the age of fourteen was quickly adopted and passed by the rump constituent National Assembly, less than two months after the Putsch. Marx-Lenin-Stalinism and Russian language have been served as compulsory meals at the uniform elementary schools for children from ages six to eleven. The Communist doctrine even prevails in the kindergartens which used to educate children from three to six years of age by games, toys, and pleasant activities. Where kindergartens exist attendance is compulsory, as the education of youth, practically from the cradle, is given first priority.

The whole educational system of Czechoslovakia has been based on the Soviet educational theory, which has as its purpose the production of a mass of workers trained to do a fast, efficient job in as narrow a field as possible. The whole educational ideal is not wide and varied knowledge, but saturation with Communist ideology.

The Communist system of indoctrinating youth quickly and thoroughly has led to an increase in the number and enrollment of high schools, colleges, and universities, but has not produced any improvement in the quality and depth of subjects taught. A proletarian background is a prerequisite for a student's admission to schools of higher learning, and a successful passing in Communist doctrine is required before he is allowed to continue his studies.

In many Czechoslovak schools Russian textbooks in Czech or Slovak translations have been used, and the Czechoslovak textbooks have been written in almost the exact image of their Russian pattern. Military education according to the Soviet model has been introduced at all schools. In the high schools, more hours are devoted to Russian than to Czech or Slovak. Education is rightly considered by the Communists as the most important single weapon in the struggle for the fundamental transformation of a nation, a society, and a way of life.

The Communists boast that this transformation has almost been

achieved in the Soviet Union, and they have planned to achieve it in Czechoslovakia. They welcome any means to this end, and have found the disintegration and perversion of moral principles especially effective in undermining society.

Children are not taught what is good and what is evil according to Christian concepts, but what is correct or wrong according to the Marx-Lenin-Stalin dialectic, the only sound and healthy basis for morality, according to the Communists. Sovietization of morals is most dangerous, because it does not preach morality, but only moral responsibility to Communist ideals. Young people are constantly reminded that their best efforts and their enthusiastic obedience are not only a civic duty, but high moral obligation. Blind obedience is not considered sufficient; there must be active participation. The Communists want tangible evidence of the submission of each man and woman, and insist that the entire population actively demonstrate its conviction.

The Communists have known very well that submission is not easy for the Czechoslovak people, not even for those organized in the Czechoslovak Communist Parties. Therefore, purges continue without interruption both inside and out of the parties, as a part of the never-ending class struggle. Their aim has been not only the elimination of every kind and degree of opposition but also the neutralization of every person who has ever owned property or has received a non-Marxist education. Fear has been applied on a large scale to party men and non-party men as a political weapon. The quick mass execution of the condemned in the Prague Slánský trial is the best evidence of this fact. All these "achievements" in political, military, economic, social, cultural, and moral spheres have been hailed by the Communists as most spectacular. Gottwald has been proclaimed the greatest son of the nation, and his era the most significant in the long Czech and Slovak history.

The Communists are of course well aware that, in spite of the far-reaching effects of sovietization, Gottwald's era did not firmly establish their rule in Czechoslovakia, and that their régime does not stand on really firm ground. Gottwald's era destroyed the bourgeois structure of the society to a very large extent, but it did not succeed in controlling the minds of its Czechoslovak subjects.

The governmental machine, organized on the Soviet pattern, is corrupt and incompetent; those officials who are reliable are mostly not competent, and those who are competent are mostly not reliable. The ceaseless screening and shifting of personnel does not improve the situation. The Czechoslovak Army has become an auxiliary corps of the Soviet Army, but it is not very efficient or reliable. The imposition of Eastern army regulations, totally strange to the political outlook and maturity of the Czechoslovak soldier, has resulted in a collapse of Army morale.

The Czechoslovak worker feels that he has been cheated and deceived. Although promised that he would be master of the production machinery,

he has become its slave. Workers have expressed their feelings by staying away from trade union meetings and meetings of the Communist Party. Trade unions in various enterprises have refused to accept the ominous job of carrying out the National Social Security scheme. The Communist Party organs often howl with indignation and plead for greater party and state discipline.

It is hardly necessary to speak about the peasants and the middle class. They hate the régime that destroyed their property and now tries to destroy them physically. Even the smallest peasants who first favored the Communists are against them today.

The régime has banned many books, but these books are widely read, by means of a lively black market. Masaryk's, Beneš', and Dostoevski's books (Dostoevski is banned in the Soviet orbit) cost 5,000 Kčs, an amount representing a worker's monthly earnings. Private reading circles are arranged which assemble in family houses. Motion picture establishments with Soviet movies are empty, whereas long queues are waiting for an American film whenever one appears. The once Russophile nation does not like to learn Russian, and theaters, once full to capacity, are half empty, although tickets are distributed gratis.

Communists and their supporters are less numerous today than they were at the time of the February 1948 Putsch, which is not surprising. It was comparatively easy to sovietize institutions, but it is impossible to sovietize (with the exception of some die-hard Communists) those people who are old enough to have kept alive memories of life in Free Czechoslovakia.

It is different with the younger generation. Tremendous efforts are being made by the Communists to indoctrinate the youth with proper ideology, and the régime has at its disposal a strong youth organization supplying agitators, activists, propagandists, and shock-workers. The numbers in this organization are increasing year by year, and many of its members are fanatical followers of the Soviet Union. Even if the Communists succeed in gaining only five out of every hundred youngsters, there is great danger, and the danger will become greater in every year to come.

Time is the most important factor in determining the fate of the Czechoslovak nation, and it is in favor of those who want to sovietize. The Communists know this very well and are playing for time, while the worried Czechs and Slovaks are praying to God and looking to the sky in the hope of finding a sign indicating that the policy of containment of the free world will be exchanged for a policy of liberation.

FOREST HILLS, NEW YORK

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

LITERATURE ON THE FIRST SERBIAN INSURRECTION (1804-1813)

by *Ivan Avakumovic*

THE FIRST news of the Serbian Insurrection in 1804 reached the European capitals at a time when the war, confined until then to Britain and France, threatened to engulf Austria and Russia. The importance of the Mediterranean, of which both sides were well aware, and the state of the Ottoman Empire attracted the attention of all the Great Powers. They were forced to increase the number of observers assigned to follow, among other affairs, the events in Serbia. In the succeeding years the former Belgrade *pashalik* was mentioned more than once in the chancelleries of Europe and in Napoleon's temporary headquarters. It provided a useful bargaining point in the conflicting and rapidly changing schemes to redraw the map of an area where the interests of four Empires clashed.

As the first successful revolt of a Balkan nation against the Turks, the Insurrection is one of the landmarks in Serbian history, and it has been the object of study by many Serbian historians who have devoted time and energy to the analysis of one or another of its aspects. Foreign historians, unable to use the Serbian language and unaware of the fairly large volume of literature on the subject in French, German and Russian, have preferred to rely on the works written in the last century by Ranke and Kallay. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to some of the most important works which have appeared in the past sixty years and which are based on and include in extenso much valuable material extracted from the main European archives.

The Turkish Empire in general, and its European provinces, especially at the end of the eighteenth century, were studied by S. Novakovich in *Tursko Carstvo pred Prvi Ustanak* (Belgrade, 1907). More detailed is Dr. D. Pantelich's *Beogradski Pasaluk pred Prvi Ustanak 1794-1804* (Belgrade, 1949), the fruit of many years' research in the Austrian archives by the leading Serbian expert on the subject. To German-speaking students of the Eastern question, its chief value lies particularly in the large number of documents published in extenso.

The only three books devoted to the entire course of events comprising the First Serbian Insurrection are Novakovich's *Der Wiedergeburt des Serbischen Staates* (Sarajevo, 1912; Serbian ed., 1904), Ranke's *A History of Servia and of the Servian Revolution* (English ed., 1874; German eds. in 1829, 1844 and 1879) and L. Arsenijevich's *Istorija Prvog Ustanka* (Belgrade, 1898-1899). Ranke was supplied with material by V. Karadjich, the eminent scholar, whose own historical writings on the subject are a valuable source for the period (Belgrade, 1898). L. Arsenijevich, a young man at the

time of the Insurrection, knew many of its leaders during their exile in Russia and wrote his study much later, largely in reply to what he felt was the biased approach by V. Karadjich and the Russian historian Dubrovin.

Several of the Serbian participants wrote their memoirs, the most useful of which are M. Nenadovich's reminiscences. The author played an important role in the struggle as a military leader, administrator and envoy to Russia and to the Congress of Vienna. The recollections of some of his contemporaries were taken down by Serbian historians and published in the Belgrade *Glasnik Drustva Srbske Slovenosti* for 1847, 1851 and 1852, and in the *Spomenik* of the Serbian Academy of Learning. One of the most assiduous collectors of material on this period was M. Milichevich, whose *Knezevina Srbija* (Belgrade, 1876) is full of stories and anecdotes which he collected as a civil servant in various parts of the country.

Throughout the entire course of Serbian history the outstanding events have been recorded in song and chanted to contemporary and following generations, accompanied by the mournful notes of the *gusle* or one-stringed fiddle. The ballads of the First Serbian Insurrection, a valuable historical source, were translated and introduced to the Anglo-American public by W. A. Morrison in his *Revolt of the Serbs against the Turks* (Cambridge, 1942).

Karageorge, the leader of the rebellion and the true father of Serbian independence, is the subject of several biographies of which the best are by Dr. D. Stranjakovich (Belgrade, 1938)¹ and M. Vukichevich's major work in two volumes. The first volume (Belgrade, 1907) deals with Karageorge's early life and devotes much space to conditions in Serbia at the time. The second (Belgrade, 1912) covers his leadership of the revolt up to the treaty of Tilsit. Both these rather diffuse volumes are based on wide research and contain documents extracted from the Russian archives.

The role of Milosh Obrenovich, Karageorge's lieutenant during these years and later ruler of Serbia, is discussed thoroughly in Dr. M. Gavrilovich's biography (Belgrade, 1908). Milosh Obrenovich's doctor, B. S. Cunibert, is the author of an interesting book on Serbia which appeared in the first half of the century. It was published in Leipzig (1850) under the title of *Essai historique sur les révolutions et l'indépendance de la Serbie depuis 1804 jusqu'à 1850*.

The late Vukichevich was also the author of a useful monograph on Karageorge's attempts to build an army (Belgrade, 1912). The role of armaments was also discussed by M. Kolarich in the Belgrade periodical *Istoriski Glasnik* (1949).

The constitutional problem which faced the Serbian rebels when they expelled the Turks from the Belgrade *pashalik* and on which full agreement was not easily reached, was discussed by S. Novakovich in *Ustavno Pitanje i Zakoni Karageorgeva Vremena* (Belgrade, 1907), in the complete works of S. Yovanovich (Belgrade, 1932) and in Y. Prodanovich's history of the

¹It contains the most up-to-date bibliography of books and articles on the subject.

political parties in Serbia published in the nineteenth century (Belgrade, 1948). D. Yankovich's doctoral dissertation on the same subject contains a Marxist interpretation of the First Serbian Insurrection (Belgrade, 1951).

Over eighty years ago, S. Markovich, one of the earliest Serbian socialists, criticized in *Srbija na Istoku* (1872, 1946) the successors of Karageorge for not following his revolutionary policy towards Turkey. The difficulties which Karageorge faced in trying to spread the insurrection to Bosnia and to obtain the effective co-operation of the Bishop of Montenegro, busy fighting the French in Dalmatia, have been discussed in several recent monographs. Dr. J. Toskovich in *Odnosi izmedju Bosne i Srbije 1805-1806 i Boj na Misaru* (Subotica, 1927) and Dr. V. Chubrilovich in *Prvi Ustanak i Bosanski Srbi* (Belgrade, 1939) dealt with the impact of events in Serbia on the Serbian Orthodox and on Moslems in Bosnia. In *Petar I Petrovich Njegosh i Njegovo Doba* (Cetinje, 1951) by the late D. Vuksan, head of the public archives at Cetinje, there is much on the relations between Karageorge and the Montenegrin clans. Dr. P. Popovich's *Crna Gora Petra I i Petra II* (Belgrade, 1951) is more concise but less detailed. Of greater use to the non-Yugoslav student of the Eastern question during the Napoleonic Wars is D. Lekitch's *La politique extérieure de Pierre I Petrovitch, Métropolitaine du Montenegro (1784-1830)*. The author devoted a large section of his doctoral dissertation, presented at the Sorbonne and based on wide research, to Franco-Turkish relations and their bearing on events in Montenegro, Serbia, North Albania and Bosnia (Paris 1940).

There is no book which deals specifically with Karageorge's foreign policy, apart from G. Yakchitch's *L'Europe et la Résurrection de la Serbie 1804-1834* (Paris, first ed., 1907). Karageorge's attempts to win the support of Austria, Russia and France in his struggle against Turkey are referred to, in passing at least, in all the above-mentioned works, for the close connection of military and diplomatic events escaped none. Reference to them appeared in reports sent by the different observers to their respective governments and in historical works.

Though Austria was forced by circumstances to desist from interfering in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, her officials on her southern frontiers and at Constantinople took a great interest in the Serbian Insurrection and were on the whole well-informed. Hundreds of their day-to-day reports in German may be consulted in the five volumes of A. Ivich's *Ispisi iz Beckih Arhiva*. They cover the years 1804-1808 and were published at Belgrade and Subotica between 1935 and 1939. For the later period information on the Austrian attitude to Serbia is provided by Krones' *Josef Freiherr von Simbschen und die Stellung Oesterreichs zur Serbischen Frage 1807-1809* (Vienna, 1890), Demelitsch's study of Metternich's foreign policy (Stuttgart, 1898), Beer's *Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774* (Prague and Leipzig, 1883) and more recently Dr. V. Popovich's *Meternihova Politika na Bliskom Istoku* (Belgrade, 1931).

Serbo-Russian relations were discussed by N. Popov in the first volume

of *Rossia i Serbia*. *Istoricheski ocherk pokrovitelstva Serbii s 1806 po 1856* (Moscow, 1869). His study was complemented by V. Bogishich's *Razbor sochinenia N. A. Popova 'Rossia i Serbia'* (Saint Petersburg, 1872) which contains a large number of documents in French and Russian from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Saint Petersburg. Other documents were published by S. Dimitrijevic in the *Spomenik LIII* of the Serbian Academy of Learning (Belgrade, 1923). The military operations in which the Serbs formed a wing of the Russian army after 1906 were described in a number of studies by Russian historians. The most detailed is A. Petrov's *Voina Rossii s Turtsei, 1806-1812* (Saint Petersburg 1885-1887).

In 1809 the Serbian insurgents, disappointed by what they felt was a lack of sympathy with their viewpoint at Vienna and Saint Petersburg, tried to enlist the support of Napoleon. Their relations with France are the subject of a doctoral dissertation by P. Popovich: *Francusko-Srpski Odnosi za Vreme Prvog Ustanka* (Belgrade, 1933). This carefully documented monograph was largely based on M. Gavrilovich's collection of documents extracted from the Paris archives and published by the Serbian Academy of Learning (Belgrade, 1904). *Ispisi iz Pariskih Arhiva* contains 769 items in French ranging from Napoleon's diplomatic and military correspondence to intelligence reports by French agents in many parts of the Balkans. Some of the documents covering the earlier period as well were published by I. Pavlovich in the Belgrade *Glasnik Srpskog Uchenog Drushtva LI* (1882) and in the *Spomenik II* (1890).

A similar compilation of dispatches from the British Embassy at Constantinople was edited by C. Mijatovich in the *Spomenik LIV* (1922).

The only archives which have not yielded many of their numerous documents on the subject are the Turkish. The lack of trained orientalists at Yugoslav universities and the state of the archives in Constantinople were responsible until recently for this wide gap in the historiography of the First Serbian Insurrection. The Serbian orientalist Dr. B. Djurdjev, who recently visited Constantinople, found there much valuable material which will be published in Belgrade as part of the commemoration of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Karageorge's revolt against the Turks.

LONDON, ENGLAND

The Shevchenko Scientific Society was founded in 1873 in Lviv (Lwów), then in Austrian Ukraine, as the rallying point of Ukrainian culture. Like most European academies it was divided into sections: History and Philosophy, Language and Literature, and Science. Under Poland (1921-1939) it continued to be active and to publish its proceedings, but it was suppressed in 1939 by the Russians and as many of the members as were able to escape fled to the west. In 1947 a goodly number of fellows of the Academy reconstituted its existence in Munich. By now a majority of the roughly 90 surviving members of the Academy are domiciled in the United States or Canada, and the *Proceedings* of the Society, after years of silence, have begun again to appear under the editorship of Prof. Nicholas D. Chubaty. As of this date two substantial numbers (vols. I, New York-Paris, 1951, and II, New York-Paris, 1952) are at hand. The first is the work of the Historical-Philosophical section, and contains 22 studies of varying length on a broad range of subjects, from prehistoric Ukraine to the Nürnberg trials. Most of the papers are in the form of reports of research which may be assumed to be planned for later monographic publication. Vol. II is the work of the Philological Section and contains 14 reports of papers read at meetings of the Society and also ranges over a broad field, from the medieval origins of the Kievan state to a study of the literary activity of the emigration since 1945. It is only proper to give this courageous venture its due praise and support. The present address of the Society is 50 Church Street, New York 7.

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The Bureau of the Central and Eastern European Commission met on June 24 in Paris. The Bureau is made up of prominent British and Central-Eastern Europeans, and is primarily interested in rallying the support of European governments and individuals to the idea of defending Europe's unity through its culture. It has made several pressing and concrete suggestions to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe toward that end. The reluctance of the Committee of Ministers at their May 8 meeting to act favorably on a suggestion to create a European Cultural Fund for Exile was deplored, and the hope was expressed that the policy of trying to assimilate European exiles, instead of supporting the preservation of their native cultures, would be abandoned.

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The School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University sponsored a five day Conference on "The Problem of Social Imperialism" in Washington, D. C. August 10-14. The coverage was as wide as Soviet Imperialism itself. Speakers and discussion leaders were chosen from the better known experts, government, the press, the professorate, and several non-Americans. Attendance was by invitation, and the Conference was run off crisply and efficiently.

* * *

The 22nd meeting of German historians joined with the 32nd German Archivtag and several similar organizations for a week's meeting in Bremen, September 14-20. The ravages of the war made German archival questions at the least topical, and on this score there was much to talk about. Likewise the "Verband der Geschichtslieber Deutschland," had pressing problems of policy and means to discuss, while the professional historians had

a full two day session. Section IV, Osteuropäische Geschichte, was devoted to seventeenth century Russia, with papers by Prof. Margarite Woltner, Mainz, "Die Einstellung gegenüber den Westeuropäern in Russland, 1613-1649" and Prof. Georg von Rauch, Marburg, "Die politische Stellung Moskaus im Kreise der europäischen Mächte des 17. Jahrhunderts bis Peter d. Grossen."

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By the decree of July 28, 1945, the Austrian central archives were unified and a single institution, the Austrian State Archives (*Das österreichische Staatsarchiv*) was created. Its general director, Dr. Leo Santifaller, launched in 1948 a new publication, *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs*.

Five volumes of the *Mitteilungen* were available at the time of writing this notice, the fifth having been published in 1952. It was not the editor's intention to reserve the *Mitteilungen* for members of his staff nor to treat only subjects for which there are sources in the State Archives. With a much broader scope, the *Mitteilungen* serve students of late medieval and modern Austrian history and should be classed with the historical reviews appearing today in Austria.

The leading article *Das österreichische Staatsarchiv* by Jakob Seidl (vol. I, pp. 3-19) should be read carefully by everyone interested in Austrian documentary materials. It gives a sketch of archival organization in Austria before and after 1918, describes changes which were introduced during the Anschluss period, and lists some of the irreparable losses during the military operations in 1945. The most lamentable destruction was that of the files of the State Council (*Staatsrat*) for the years 1760 to 1833, comparable with the burning of the files of the Bohemian-Austrian State Chancellery of about the same period during the riots in July 1927.

Vol. III of the *Mitteilungen* was dedicated to the General Director and has contributions dealing with both medieval and modern problems. It appeared as a *Festschrift* for Dr. Santifaller's sixtieth birthday.

Vol. V. has two contributions of wider interest. Prof. F. Engel-Janosi published (pp. 278-300) an article on "Österreich-Ungarn und das Vatican während des Pontifikats Pius' X. und der Wahl Benedikt's XV.," a chapter concerning the highly interesting story of relations between the Habsburg Court and the Vatican in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Dr. Ferdinand Hauptmann published in the fifth volume (pp. 122-249) a long study, "Österreich-Ungarn's Werben um Serbien, 1878-1881," presented originally as a doctoral dissertation and based mostly on diplomatic documents deposited in the *Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv*.

This institution, which today is a section of the *Staatsarchiv*, was founded in connection with the administrative reforms of Maria Theresa in 1749. Its bicentennial was commemorated in September 1949. To mark the jubilee it was decided to publish two volumes of essays as supplements to the *Mitteilungen*. Vol. I. of the *Festschrift zur Feier des zweihundertjährigen Bestandes des Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchivs* appeared in 1950 (viii, +795 pages). Vol. II. was published in 1951 (viii, +560 pages), edited by Dr. Leo Santifaller. The list of contributors (about ninety) and the table of contents have been appended to the second volume of the bulky *Festschrift*.
Columbia University

OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

BOOK REVIEWS

BOZIC, IVAN, *Dubrovnik i Turska u XIV i XV veku*, Srpska akademija nauka, Posebna izdanja, CC, Istoriski institut, 3, (Beograd, 1952). Pp. viii, 394. *Srpska akademija nauka, Gradja*, VIII, Istoriski institut 7, *Gradja za istoriju srpskog pokreta u Vojvodini 1848-1849*, Serija I, knjiga 1, Mart - Juni 1848 (Beograd, 1952). Pp. li, 548.

The year 1953 marks the 500th anniversary of the fall of the Byzantine state and the triumph of the Ottoman Turks. The appearance of Mr. Božić's work on Dubrovnik and the Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is thus most appropriate. Once again scholars are given the opportunity to assess the significance of the Turkish domination of the Balkan peninsula. When one realizes the tremendous power and military efficiency of the Turks, one appreciates more fully the successful struggle of Dubrovnik to avoid the fate which befell the Serbs, Bulgars, Bosnians and other Balkan peoples.

Mr. Božić states that his purpose is to trace the relations between Dubrovnik and the Ottoman empire in the century preceding the final domination of the Balkans by the Turks in the 1480's. The period under discussion is divided into two parts, the first ending in 1458. Up to this date the rulers in Dubrovnik worked with the European powers and shared their belief that the Turks could be expelled from the Balkans. When the fall of Constantinople demonstrated the permanence of the Turkish triumph, the city-state saw the necessity of abandoning its resistance. Thus in 1458 a policy of cooperation with the victor was adopted. Eventually Dubrovnik even called upon the Turks for assistance when under pressure from the western states.

The material prosperity of the city-state was based on its trade, especially with its hinterland. In the time of Tsar Dušan the trade with Serbia was of the greatest importance to both participants. The loss of this lucrative source of income could mean the economic paralysis of the city. Thus when the Turks conquered the Balkans, Dubrovnik's continued existence as a commercial power was dependent on the terms she could gain from the Ottoman state. As early as 1442 Dubrovnik was forced to pay a yearly tribute of 1000 ducats, which was increased to 15,000 in 1480. However, the advantages gained far surpassed the amount of the tribute. In the first place, Dubrovnik was guaranteed wide autonomy and existed as a half-independent (*poluzavisne*) republic. Second, and more important, the merchants of Dubrovnik eventually were granted rights to trade in *all* lands under Turkish control whether in the Balkans or Asia Minor. Moreover, the duty which these traders had to pay was only two per cent, whereas the European merchants were required to pay as much as five per cent. As a result of his investigations Božić has come to the conclusion that the concessions which were gained from the Turks benefited the city more than the privileges enjoyed in commercial relations with medieval Serbia.

This study should prove of particular value to those interested in the early economic history of the Ottoman empire and the eastern Mediterranean. It is a fine scholarly work, written in an effective style. For those unfamiliar with Serbo-Croatian, a twenty page summary in German has been added.

The second book under review is of a different nature but of equal interest. It is the first volume of a series of documents which are to be published on the role of the Serbs in the *Vojvodina* during the revolution of 1848-1849. Hitherto

only fragmentary material has been available on this subject, but even the present collection is far from exhaustive. In the preface the editor-in-chief, Radoslav Perović, states that many archives which should have been examined were unavailable. Among these were collections in Vienna, Budapest, Temišvar (Rumania) and the Czartoryski papers in Cracow. Post-war developments obviously were responsible for this situation, but it is interesting to note that even the archives of the patriarchate in Belgrade were inaccessible despite the fact that the Orthodox church played a vital role in the Serbian revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, the collection presents a tremendous amount of information on the social implications of the revolution, the growth of Serbian national feeling, the "March days" in the Serbian cities and villages, the ideological factors which affected the participants and the Serbian attitude toward the Magyars.

The volume begins with the resolutions adopted by the Serbs in Budapest on March 5, 6, 7, 1848, and presented to the Magyars. Here the Serbs formulated the concessions which they would expect to receive from the Magyars in return for aid against the Habsburgs. These included recognition of the Serbian nationality, the right to use the Serbian language, equal treatment in religious matters, freedom to build churches, etc. In the succeeding documents the story of the gradual breakdown of Serbian-Magyar relations unfolds. The climax is reached in the final document, which is dated four months later, when at the end of June the Serbs had finally abandoned negotiations with the Magyars and had joined the war against them.

The documents in the collection are in Serbian. However, if the original was in another language, and many are in Magyar, French, German and Latin, the original is printed after the translation. At the end of the volume there is a name index, a geographic index, an historical index and a guide to archaic and foreign words. Finally, there is a list of the documents showing the place of origin together with a short description of the contents of each. These aids are excellent and enable one to use the volume with great ease.

It is to be hoped that the succeeding volumes will measure up to the standard and emphasize more clearly the role which the Southern Slavs played in it. The entire series is also to be welcomed because of the scarcity of printed documents on any aspect of Balkan internal history in the nineteenth century.

University of California

CHARLES JELAVICH

GOERLITZ, WALTER, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*. Transl.

Brian Battershaw. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. Pp. 508. \$7.50.

Among the many books written lately about the German generals, this account has the distinction of not being written by a high ranking German officer, but by a young German who claims to have been no more than an enlisted soldier who turned to military history from "passionate conviction."

Walter Goerlitz is a prolific writer who, in addition to this book, has to his credit a number of biographies of famous generals, and a two volume history of the second world war which has just been published.

The German version of his book on the General Staff was published in 1950. (See *Journal*, Jan., 1952, p. 422), and has gained greatly in the editing and cutting done in the translation.

His more conservative colleagues in the field of military history accuse the author of sacrificing historical accuracy to political speculation and brilliant style. It is true that at times he indulges in conjectures, and that he does not always back

up his conclusions with solid facts, a difficult task because so much of the most recent documentary evidence was either destroyed or captured. In fairness to the author it ought to be said that many of the German books about World War II and the role of the German generals are eulogies, or at any rate attempts to explain grave errors in judgment as inevitable because of the interference of Hitler in military decisions.

What Goerlitz tries to show in his *History of the German General Staff* is the gradual deterioration of the General Staff as an institution and of its members from the days of Gneisenau and Clausewitz to the bitter end under Keitel and Jodl. About half the book deals with the outstanding personalities of the General Staff up to 1918, the other half is devoted to the most recent period.

The author is most critical of the role played by the General Staff since 1920 and their lack of political wisdom. He coldly analyzes the political mistakes made at crucial times in German history, and the inglorious role played by some of the generals under Hitler. But he does give credit to those members of the officers' corps who tried to stem the disastrous tide, and who showed more political courage than their colleagues who stayed on to serve under Hitler from a sense of duty, or because of ambition and vanity.

He takes issue, above all, with generals who meddled in politics, such as Seeckt and Schleicher, without fully comprehending the dangers of their constant interference in affairs which should have been decided by the duly constituted civilian government of the German Republic. He blames the intrigues of Schleicher, Papen and young Hindenburg for the events that led to President Hindenburg's sudden reversal when he appointed Hitler chancellor.

On the other hand, the author recognizes the fact that a number of generals, among them Beck, were opposed to the program of military expansion mapped out by the Nazis. But others, such as Keitel and Jodl, come in for severe criticism, and Goerlitz ridicules the oft repeated statement that Hitler was a military genius. In his opinion, Hitler not only was ignorant of military strategy, and distrustful of his own General Staff, but both Hitler and the General Staff were to blame for the disastrous defeat and the long drawn out war, one because he gave orders without knowing anything, the others for knowing better but not doing anything to deter Hitler.

Goerlitz' thesis is that the General Staff, once proud of their tradition and their professional ethics, failed Germany miserably by either selling out to Hitler, or standing aside passively, chagrined at what was going on, but resisting too late to avert the total collapse of Germany.

Vassar College

ALMA M. LUCKAU

LOCHMAN, J. M., *Náboženské myšlení českého obrození*. 1. Prague: Komenského evangelická bohoslovecká fakulta, 1952. Pp. 380.

Jan Milič Lochman, a member of the teaching staff at the Comenius Protestant School of Theology, undertook the study of religious thought and sentiment among the Czechs in the era of national awakening. The first volume of his work appeared in 1952 and covers the early period before the advent of the true emancipators and intellectual leaders. There are several points of contact between his book and the monograph on the common people in Bohemia and their outlook by František Kutnar which has been reviewed in this *Journal* (see vol. X, pp. 60-62). This is true especially of the third section of Kutnar's book in which he treated religious views and visions among the peasantry.

Lochman is a theologian and endeavors to analyze the currents of thought in the lands of the Bohemian Crown under the Enlightened Monarchs, Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In that period, from 1740 to 1790, the lines between the two nationalities, Czechs and Germans, inhabiting that area, were not sharply drawn and the educated classes, when they gave up Latin, wrote mostly in German. As far as the Czechs were concerned, it is appropriate to speak of "the days of small things," in which the symptoms of regeneration became evident. The author correctly decided to study the writings from that period as the products of the enlightened thought, linked by ideological affinity and the identity of purpose. Only toward the end of the eighteenth century did there rise from humble origins to prominence some scholars whose place is definitely among the pioneers of the Czech national revival, such as František Faustin Procházka, Václav Fortunát Durych, František Martin Pelcl, and above all, Matěj Valentin Kramerius.

It can be surmised that Lochman's book had passed through the hands of a vigilant censor before its publication was authorized. There is no better evidence thereof than the suppression of the name of T. G. Masaryk where it should have been mentioned. In such studies as the *Česká otázka* T. G. Masaryk assigned to the religious element so much importance in the progress of the Czech awakening that he was opposed, not only by his former political partner Josef Kaizl, but also by some historians, notably by Josef Pekař. While those two names appear in the book (pp. 355-6), and Pekař has been branded as "the foremost spokesman of reactionary Czech historiography," only vague references have been made to Masaryk's initiative and his name omitted from the context.

What is the main trend of Lochman's observations and conclusions? His book opens with general remarks on the thought of the Enlightenment and its echoes in the Habsburg domains, especially in Bohemia. In the fourth chapter the author passes from generalities to the specific conditions in Bohemia before 1750. His attention is focussed on two phenomena, the waning of the Jesuit influence and the activities of their opponents, mostly laymen. The faint echoes of Jansenism and of the concepts of L. A. Muratori reached at least small and exclusive circles.

From then on the author treats alternately two themes, the efforts to reform the Roman church by infusion of the enlightened spirit, and the re-emergence of Protestantism, the extermination of which seemed to have been accomplished under Maria Theresa's father, Charles VI. In harmony with this general approach the author has devoted several chapters to the upper layers of the population, especially to the learned circles, while in others he has turned to the common folk to find the segments which had resisted the pressure and declared themselves Protestants when the Edict of Toleration of 1781 made such a step possible.

Conditions in the lands of the Bohemian Crown differed in many respects from a fairly simple picture in other Habsburg possessions. The secret non-Catholics in Czech districts regarded themselves as descendants of either the Hussite Church *sub utraque*, or of the Unity of Czech Brethren. Books from the Reformation period were scarce but throughout the eighteenth century reprints of the Bible, song and prayer books, as well as translations of some Reformation classics, were produced in Germany and smuggled across the border. As the Edict of Toleration authorized only two denominations, Lutheranism and Calvinism, its appeal to the Czechs was greatly reduced. The mass defection from the Roman Church which had been feared before its promulgation did not take place.

With these facts in mind the author has given more space to the trends within

the body of the Catholics than to the re-emerging Protestants. The advocates of Church reform, which was to be engineered and supported by the state authority, figure prominently in several chapters of the book. Taking into account the specific conditions in Bohemia, some pioneers of Josephinism turned to the earlier history of the country and revived memories of John Hus and of his striving for Church reform. In doing so they had no intention of promoting Protestantism but rather of making popular the Josephinian tenets more as a replica of Hus' teachings. Three names, none of them Czech, make the study more concrete. Caspar Royko, a native of Styria and Professor of Church History in Prague, was guided by the enlightened ideas in compiling a large work on the Council of Constance, *Geschichte der grossen allgemeinen Kirchenversammlung zu Konstanz*. An ex-Jesuit, J. H. Wolf, adopted the same attitude as Royko when writing, in 1784, a biography of the Czech reformer. Thirdly, Augustin Zitte, a priest in the Litoměřice diocese, published in 1786-1790 three books on the origin of Hussitism, one devoted to Hus' forerunners, another to John Wyclif, and the last one, *Lebensbeschreibung des Mag. Johannes Huss von Hussinecz*, to Hus himself. It was of great importance that two volumes of Royko's *Geschichte* were put into Czech in 1785-6 by Václav Stach, writing under the name of Václav Petryn. Thus they were given wider circulation on the Czech side than either Wolf's or Zitte's works.

In the last and rather long chapter there figure the scholars and thinkers who are usually listed among the chief promoters of intellectual activities before Joseph Dobrovsky, the patriarch of modern Czech learning. Some of them were members of the clergy, others represented the lay element. Few of them participated directly in public affairs or made themselves conspicuous by writing on current problems, their chief occupation being research and learned work.

It is necessary to turn to the last member of this gallery, Kramerius (1753-1808), for a concrete example of Czech Josephinism. He is one of the leading figures among the Awakeners, known as compiler, publisher and distributor of pamphlets and books for popular reading. Two publications issued by him fall within the scope of Lochman's survey, "The Book of Joseph," and the Christian Catholic "Useful Postilla for Homereading." In both cases Kramerius freely translated German products of the spirit of the Enlightenment. In the first case the author was F. A. Zieger, in which name F. M. Bartoš sees a pseudonym for Augustin Zitte. The book of Joseph was a eulogy of the Monarch and of his policy. The author of the second title was an Austrian pamphleteer, J. V. Eybel (1741-1805), whose *Christlichkatholische nützliche Hauspostille* appeared in Linz in 1784. Kramerius succeeded in translating only a small part of this collection of written sermons, which was permeated by Josephinian ideas and fiercely attacked from the conservative ranks. Although Kramerius had a large clientele among the Czech Protestants, he destined his translation of Eybel for "the enlightenment of the simple Catholic folk," guided, as were many of his contemporaries, by the conviction that the reform of the Roman Church would be a far more satisfactory solution than adoption of the Protestant creed by large segments of the population.

It is certainly not accidental that a book devoted to such a topic as the religious thought in the era of Enlightenment was allowed to appear under present circumstances. Though written soberly and with restraint, it is keyed to the same tune as the statements of official policy in regard to Protestantism and the reformist tendencies among the Catholics, and it must be viewed as a reflection of contemporary trends, not as a purely analytical study.

MAASS, FERDINAND, *Der Josephinismus. Quellen zu seiner Geschichte in Österreich. 1760-1790. I. Band: Ursprung und Wesen des Josephinismus. 1760-1769. Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1951. Pp. 396. 16 plates; II. Band: Entfaltung und Krise des Josephinismus. 1770-1790. Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1953. Pp. 560. 8 plates.*

The Austrian Academy in Vienna has resumed publication of the *Fontes rerum Austriacarum*. In the second section of this well-known collection, *Diplomataria et Acta*, are published under the above title archival materials from the age of the Enlightenment Monarchs as volumes 71 and 72. The editor spent many years in preparatory studies, selecting documents from the vast amount of official files and arranging them topically. An analytical study from his pen, "Vorbereitung und Anfänge des Josephinismus," appeared in the *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs* (vol. I, 1948, pp. 289-444) and discussed the Habsburg policy in Milan designed by Prince Kaunitz and carried out in 1763-1770, by his plenipotentiary Count Charles Firmian.

The two volumes of the *Fontes* have a much wider scope than this monograph. They relate to the entire Habsburg patrimony and some of them are of general importance for European history in that era. The collection is not yet complete. A third volume is in preparation and is to be devoted to internal problems of the Habsburg hereditary lands.

The editor has written for each volume a fairly comprehensive introduction (pp. 1-105 in vol. 71, and pp. 1-126 in vol. 72) which should be consulted before any serious study of the published materials is undertaken, as it ties together the scattered data and sketches briefly the course of events to which the documents refer.

The title of the publication, however, is somewhat misleading. The name which occurs most often is not that of Joseph II but of Prince Kaunitz-Rittberg. The originator of the *renversement des alliances* devoted, after 1764, both his time and talents to ecclesiastical matters, advising the monarch during the preliminary discussions and ironing out many conflicts which arose from the consequent applications of the official doctrine. The subjects treated in the meetings on the top level and then embodied in reports, letters and Court decrees were many and covered a wide range. With the passage of time the emphasis shifted from one field to another. But the main theme to which the published documents refer was the varying relationship between the absolutist state and the Roman Church.

It goes without saying that the collection is not destined only for specialists in Austrian history. A good linguistic equipment is required as the documents are in German, Italian, French and Latin. The steps taken by the Vienna Court in church matters had usually wide repercussions in other capitals, especially at the Papal Court. In the early period, covered by volume 71, the conflicting interests of the Habsburg State and in the Roman Curia occupied both the leading advisers of Maria Theresa and the Church dignitaries. As time went on, the scope widened and secular affairs also claimed the time and attention of the Queen and of men around her.

In the provinces which were transferred to the Vienna branch of the Habsburg family by the peace of Utrecht, many problems were left open throughout the reign of Charles VI and the Wars of the Austrian Succession. That was true especially of Milan where the laws and usages differed in many points from Austria or Bohemia. Interventions from the side of the Court in the internal affairs of Lombardy were more bitterly resented than in the hereditary lands. The

Roman Curia also watched the developments there with growing concern as the province had many ties with other states in the peninsula, and the Habsburg measures could easily be imitated by other princes.

The decision to publish modern materials in the *Fontes*, devoted since inauguration of the series almost exclusively to medieval sources, was a happy one and should be gratefully acknowledged. Such analyses of the Austrian Enlightenment as *Der Josephinismus* by Fritz Valjavec (see this *Journal*, vol. VII, pp. 421-2), or *Der Josephinismus und seine Geschichte* by Eduard Winter aroused interest in the political and intellectual forces in the Habsburg dominions in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Since 1945 some Austrian historians have made this very period their field of specialization. Such a scholarly contribution as Maass' two volumes is likely to lead to detailed studies of various facets of the Enlightenment in the Habsburg domains or to biographies of its champions.

Let it be stated that after some vacillation the Austrian Academy of Sciences made a decision in favor of the traditional spelling 'Josephinismus', and rejected the form 'Josefinismus'.

Columbia University

OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

KOSTIĆ, MITA, *Dositej Obradović u istoriskoj perspektivi XVIII i XIX veka* (Dositej Obradović in the historical perspective of the XVIII and XIX centuries), Belgrade, 1952. Srpska Akademija Nauka, Posebna Isdanja, Vol. CXC. Istoriski Institut, No. 2. Pp. 304.

SEČANSKI, ŽIVAN, ed., *Gradja o Ticanovoj buni u Sreću 1807 godine* (Materials on the Tican uprising in Syrmia in 1807), Belgrade, 1952. Srpska Akademija Nauka, Gradja, Vol. VI, Istoriski Institut, No. 5. Pp. 195.

ŠKRIVANIĆ, GAVRO, ed., *Dnevnik Dubrovčanina Mihajla Pesia o Pozarevackom Kongresu 1718 godine* (The diary of Mihajlo Pešić of Dubrovnik on the peace conference at Passarowitz in 1718), Belgrade, 1952. Srpska Akademija Nauka, Gradja, Vol. VII, Istoriski Institut, No. 6. Pp. 71.

These three recent publications of the Serbian Academy of Sciences offer evidence of the vigorous state of historical research in Yugoslavia. They are of interest both as original scholarly contributions based on unpublished sources, and as examples of the trend of historiography in Tito's Yugoslavia.

The most important of these is the critical life of the Serbian literary pioneer Obradović, by Mita Kostić. The author is known for his work in the eighteenth century, and his most significant previous publication is a monograph on the reforms of Count Koller in Serbia in the 1770's (Belgrade, 1932). In what may well be the definitive biography of Obradović, Kostić devotes the first part of this study to a thorough factual scrutiny of his career, and documents the many inaccuracies of his own *Life and Adventures* (1783). Particular attention is devoted in this section to the influence on Obradović of his period of residence in Vienna in the 1770's, which marked his final transition from clericalism to rationalism. It is also interesting to note that one of the important influences on his thought was the legislation of Peter the Great that reorganized the Russian church in 1721. He learned of it from the Bishop of Temesvar, and it served as one of the sources of inspiration for his later plan of church reform.

After his survey of the varied career of Obradović, Kostić turns to an analysis of his ideas. He devotes special attention to the views of Obradović in the fields of philosophy, education, literature, church reform, and politics, and points out

the strains of the Russian as well as the Western enlightenment that influenced his thinking. This is perhaps the most valuable part of Kostić's work for the Western reader, since it describes in great detail the various channels by which Western thought became a part of the Serbian intellectual heritage. It illustrates also the manner in which Russia, in the eighteenth century, served in some measure as an interpreter of Western thought to the South Slavs.

In his final section Kostić discusses the contribution of Obradović to Serbian intellectual development. His brief survey of Serbian cultural growth from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries describes the background of Obradović's thought, and introduces a discussion of his impact on subsequent Serbian and South Slav intellectual history. Throughout this monograph the author shows a wide acquaintance with the sources and published materials in many languages. Detailed notes compensate in some measure for the lack of a bibliography, and use of the work is facilitated by an index of names and a brief summary in German.

Towards the end of his career Obradović spent a year in Syrmia, and his visit coincided with the uprising against the Austrian authorities in April, 1807. Syrmia was a frontier district that had changed hands between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires on several occasions, and finally fell to the latter in the settlement of 1718. Serbian refugees from the Turkish conquest had settled in Syrmia in the sixteenth century, and had acquired certain rights of local autonomy. By the end of the eighteenth century their position had declined due to the increasing economic burdens imposed by the Habsburgs to finance their wars, and issues stemming from this situation led to the brief and unsuccessful uprising known to history after the name of its leader, Tican.

The documents edited by Sečanski, who is preparing a full-length study of this incident, are from the archives of Belgrade, Novi Sad, Zagreb, and the Serbian Archbishopric of Sremski Karlovci. They bring to light much new material on the causes and organization of the uprising, and on the measures taken by the Austrian government to suppress it. They also clarify the role of Stratimirović, the Serbian Archbishop of Sremski Karlovci, who threw his influence behind the Austrian authorities in this crisis. As a feudal landholder the Archbishop opposed the Tican uprising, but as a Serbian he supported the much more significant revolt against the Turks in nearby Belgrade. It was to gain his assistance for this revolt that Obradović negotiated with Stratimirović in 1806-7, and Kostić tells us that although he opposed the Archbishop's policy in Syrmia he respected the vigor of the clergyman's nationalism.

The treaty of Passarowitz, by which Austria finally gained possession of Syrmia, is the subject of a second volume of sources edited by Skrivanić. The diary of Pešić, chaplain and secretary of the consul of Dubrovnik in Constantinople who represented his government at the peace conference, was found among the papers of the Gracić family in the Dubrovnik archives. It provides new details of the peace conference from the point of view of Dubrovnik, whose delegates succeeded in preventing the cession to Venice of strategic territories in which they were interested.

It should be noted in conclusion that there is no evidence of Marxian influence in these three publications. It is true that two of them are collections of sources and are not suitable vehicles for Marxian doctrine, yet in the editors' introductions there is room for Marxian terminology and interpretations if the authors wished or were required to employ them. Perhaps the choice of topics safely removed from current affairs was dictated by political reasons, yet this is

not likely since the Serbian national movement is a favorite topic of Yugoslav historiography. May one therefore not conclude that the guidance given to historical research in Communist Yugoslavia is at least more subtle than that provided in the U. S. S. R.?

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

STÄHLIN, FRIEDRICH, *Napoleons Glanz und Fall in deutschen Urteil. Wandlungen des deutschen Napoleonbildes*. Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1952. Pp. 147. DM 4.80.

This volume is a product of the postwar reflectiveness of German intellectuals on the causes of victory and defeat which the overthrow of the National Socialist régime brought in its train. Stählin's faithful, if at times somewhat laborious, recounting of the various opinions which have been expressed in Germany about Napoleon's strengths and weaknesses makes the reader pause to wonder whether Leopold von Ranke's dictum, "*Es zu schreiben wie es eigentlich gewesen war*," is within the realm of possibility.

In 1942, when the Germans were suffering the bitter pangs of defeat, Stählin began collecting material for the subject discussed in this treatise. He completed his work in 1950, but the volume was not published until 1952.

The book begins with an examination of what constitutes historical greatness and ends with a comparison of Napoleon and Hitler. First, there is an account of the development of the Napoleonic legend in France. This is followed by a discussion of the impression which Napoleon made on the British, Russians, Spaniards, and Italians. Then there are chapters dealing with the views of the French Emperor's many admirers in Germany during the period between 1806 and 1813, and with the views expressed about Napoleon by enemies like Fichte, Arndt, Stein, Kleist, Goerres, and Pestalozzi. Next there are chapters giving the opinions of Napoleon of representative nineteenth and twentieth century poets, historians, prophets (Goethe and Nietzsche are taken up in this chapter), and interpreters of history. At the end there is a summary in which the author attempts to synthesize all the various viewpoints expressed by the above groups in regard to Napoleon.

Perhaps on account of the very nature of the subject with which the author deals the organization of the volume is at times a little confusing and the work is of necessity rather repetitious. This reviewer feels that the author should have placed more emphasis than he did on the opinions of Napoleonic scholars. Why, for instance, devote a whole chapter to Goethe's and Nietzsche's views on Napoleon, and a fairly substantial amount of space to the views of Friedrich Gundolf and Houston Stuart Chamberlain, and only a relatively few lines to those of Kircheisen, Oncken, and Fournier? And why has so much emphasis been put on Oswald Spengler and so little on Friedrich Meinecke? These, however, are relatively minor points. Stählin does make a contribution in presenting the changes in the German mind in regard to the French emperor during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—perhaps more than he does to the growing historiography of Napoleon and his times.

The University of Texas

R. JOHN RATH

FREDBORG, ARVID, *Storbritannien och den ryska frågan 1918-20. Studier i de anglo-ryska relationerna från vapenstillståndet den 11 november 1918 till den begynnande auspänningen i januari och februari 1920*. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1951. Pp. xxiv, 328. Kr. 24.

In opposition to a common enemy—now French, now German—the Russians, in three major crises of modern history, have fought beside the English and their allies. More frequently, however, the relations between them have been marked by rivalry and hostility, sometimes by severe tension and conflict.

One such period came at the close of World War I. The volume here reviewed attempts a full-length study of it. With some finesse the author analyses British official views on the Russian question and describes the reaction of major currents of British public opinion. Sharpest disagreements came over the intervention issue. In the highest Allied circles the French favored it, the Americans veered off, and the British fitfully supported it. Several persons in high place, a Curzon, a Churchill, a Sir Henry Wilson, favored it as did the rank and file of Conservative opinion. Labor generally was opposed. At the center was the non-too-predictable Lloyd George who might veer and turn in response to his own political insights.

What emerged on the policy level was at best uncertainty, at worst a dead center, a kind of absence of policy. The sort of intervention favored usually was indirect rather than direct, a support of elements already in the field, rather than the dispatch of new Allied units, in force.

Fredborg's volume could not have been written, in its present form, without help of the First Series (three volumes) of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*. The author has drawn generously also on parliamentary debates and papers and on appropriate volumes of the State Department's *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. He has thus been able to summarize many of the memoranda prepared in official circles, though frequently not adopted, on the questions at issue. Some Russian diplomatic sources have also been consulted. Published memoirs of several of the important figures have been freely drawn upon (some additional ones might have been mentioned for the sake of completeness) and these have been supplemented through correspondence and interviews with several of the participants still living. There has been generous use of the papers of Sir Henry Wilson. But the reader should remember that some fairly important sources are not yet available. For instance the author was unable to see the important papers of Lloyd George. So too, files of the Admiralty and the War Office are still closed for this period.

There is necessarily a tentative quality about certain aspects of Fredborg's study, yet the volume has its merits. For one thing it poses the right questions (for eventual answer). Moreover, it is quite possible that later material, when scrutinized, will in the main sustain the conclusions here offered a bit tentatively, e.g., that in shaping the anti-Bolshevist policy British investments were relatively unimportant, that on the intervention issue British policy vacillated at times because of a reluctance to desert those who had not come to terms with the enemy after Brest-Litovsk, just as there may have lingered throughout a hope (inchoate perhaps and largely inarticulate) that somehow enough Soviet energies might be engaged in the East to prevent a rapprochement with the cardinal enemy of recent days, Germany.

In case there had been no British intervention, what might the Bolsheviks then have accomplished? The author seems convinced that they would have swallowed up the Baltic States, probably have taken Bessarabia from Rumania, and pushed Poland westward. In his own subjective reactions the author may share the wish that the British intervention could have been more firm than it was, but any preference he may have is not readily discernible; he discusses the several sides of the story and his narrative remains uniformly objective.

Fredborg has to his credit a decade of experience as journalist, publicist and editor. Some readers will remember him as *Svenska Dagbladet's* youthful wartime correspondent in Berlin and as author of *Behind the Steel Wall* (1944). The present study, first submitted as a thesis for the doctorate, has a compact and meaty style about it, which may owe something to the earlier journalistic experience. There is a bibliographical essay on the sources, which might well have been expanded to characterize a few more of the leading secondary works (some are the subjects of brief remarks in scattered footnotes). There is an index of persons, but not of topics. Several slips are corrected in an errata list which the editors might well have extended (e.g., Spiker, p. 167; Lord Curzon, p. 266; Churchill, p. 319).

What we have then is a serious detailed work on one of the critical periods of Anglo-Russian relations. If the author is disposed to do a sequel—in the years just following, the English political scene changed leadership with unwonted frequency—he should feel encouraged to do so, by the measure of substantial accomplishment he has attained in this initial volume.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

SALANDRA, ANTONIO, *Memorie politiche, 1916-1925*. Milan: Garzanti, 1951. Pp. vii, 139. Lire 500.

These are posthumously published excerpts of the memoirs of the right-wing Italian liberal, Antonio Salandra (1853-1931), who as premier led his country into World War I. They deal with four topics: (1) the fall of Salandra's ministry in June 1916; (2) his role at the time of the Fascist "March on Rome" in October 1922; (3) his collaboration and subsequent break (January 1925) with Mussolini; and (4) a summary of his work as Italian delegate to the League of Nations Council between 1922 and 1925.

Regarding the first, Salandra reproduces the explanatory memorandum he presented to King Victor Emmanuel III when he resigned. While he concedes that differences over military strategy were a factor, he insists that the ministerial crisis of 1916 resulted mainly from the unexpected protraction of the war, which had led to material shortages on the home front and grumbling over restrictions of freedom. In these circumstances, neutralists and certain interventionists not then in the government combined to overthrow it. A conservative nationalist, Salandra preferred to resign in favor of Paolo Boselli, rather than broaden his government to include members of the "so-called democratic parties, dominated by international Masonry, which would have been inclined . . . to hitch the Italian monarchy to the wagon of the French republic." (p. 6)

During the rest of the war Salandra remained in the background, but he was a delegate to the peace conference. Skipping those years, he next takes up the political crisis of the autumn of 1922. The ex-premier was deeply impressed by Mussolini's rising strength, especially in Tuscany and Apulia, and openly suggested in September that legal form be given "without delay to the inevitable advent of Fascism." (p. 17) It therefore is not surprising that Mussolini, while en route to the fateful convention of *squadrists* in Naples, visited Salandra in his home on October 23. Mussolini proposed that in a new government to be formed after Premier Facta's resignation, the Fascists (but excluding himself) receive five ministries (but not Interior.) On October 28 Costanzo Ciano intimated to Salandra that Mussolini was ready to go along with a government headed either by Salandra or Orlando. That afternoon Salandra saw the King and suggested to him that Orlando

be asked to form a government with Mussolini in it. But at 6 p.m. the King telephoned Salandra, asking him to try to form a cabinet. Salandra thereupon inquired of Fascist leaders if Mussolini would enter such a government, but was informed the next morning that the latter now insisted on taking the premiership himself. Salandra received this news "with real jubillance," for it ended the possibility of his trying to share executive power with a man who at that very moment did not hesitate to use physical force to gain office.

At first, Salandra, as well as other "liberals of the Right" in Parliament, extended full support to Mussolini's government, regarding Fascist rule as the lesser of possible evils. Moreover, Salandra hoped that gradually he could guide the Fascists into traditional liberal norms of political action. Of course, in this he failed. He and his associates were shocked by the brutal murder of Matteotti in June 1924, but they did not join the Aventinian secessionists from Parliament, lest they give the impression they thought Mussolini personally responsible for the crime and afford advantage to "subversive elements" on the left. But grave doubts regarding continued collaboration began to arise in Salandra's mind.

The break occurred at the end of the year, ostensibly because of Mussolini's improper handling of budgetary matters with which Salandra was then occupied in Parliament. But it was also precipitated by the Opposition's sensational publication of the Rossi revelations of Fascist complicity in the Matteotti murder, disclosures which forced Mussolini to take the final step in imposing totalitarianism. The next day (January 4, 1925) Salandra tendered his resignation as delegate to the League Council. Thereafter, he virtually withdrew from public life, although in 1928 he was appointed by the King to the moribund Senate.

From the first, Salandra was skeptical of the League of Nations, about which he knew almost nothing before his appointment. (The most frequent onlookers in Geneva, he comments, were "married and unmarried women, generally neither young nor pretty, of the 'suffragette' type and mostly Anglo-Saxon in race, for whom the unsatisfied need for love manifested itself in love for the League of Nations.") (p. 87). But in Geneva he seems to have acquired some understanding of the force of world opinion and to have discovered some advantages for Italy in the League. It was partly because of his skillful maneuvers in settling the Corfu dispute "out of court" in 1923 that Mussolini was restrained from taking Italy out of the League.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

GURIAN, WALDEMAR (ed.), *Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics. A Symposium*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1953. Pp. vii, 166. \$3.75.

Is Soviet expansionism simply a new mask concealing an old Russian drive to conquer and rule other peoples, or is it an entirely novel ideological variety of imperialism, which rules by force over the Russian people, as well as over the many other peoples included within the Soviet bloc? Should the aim of the free world be to return the Soviet régime or its successor to the boundaries of 1938, or should it strive eventually to reduce the Russian state to what would still be a vast territory, the areas inhabited primarily by Great Russian stock? This is a crucial and basic question, which has been stated with force and clarity by Waldemar Gurian, in the first paper of the Notre Dame symposium on *Soviet Imperialism*. The answers given to the question inevitably reflect the varied viewpoints of the participants in the symposium, but all contribute to a fuller understanding of the problem.

N. S. Timasheff gives a forthright historical description of the territorial am-

bitions of Imperial Russia, analyzing the geographic and territorial factors which determined their direction, and comparing its expansion with that of other great powers. He draws a sharp and valid contrast between this traditional record of limited expansion and the universalist ambitions of the Soviet leadership, which he feels are not shared by the Russian people as a whole. While he does not define the minimum number of territories which should constitute "Russia," Professor Timasheff issues a strong warning against "dismembering" the greater Russian state.

Michael Pap, on the other hand, stresses the cultural and historic distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people, before and under Soviet rule; perhaps the national identity of the Ukrainian people is much more widely and willingly recognized than Dr. Pap assumes. A brief study of Richard E. Pipes of "Russian Moslems Before and After the Revolution," forerunner of a long study now in progress, presents a succinct and enlightening comparison of Imperial Russian and Soviet policies toward the Moslem peoples of the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Urals and Central Asia. Dr. Pipes traces the contrast between the development of modern education and technology among these peoples and the ruthless application of genocide to entire peoples, such as the Crimean Tartars, the Kalmyks, the Chechen and Ingush.

In a study of "Soviet Cultural Imperialism in Poland," Wiktor Weintraub emphasizes the differences between the direct Russification practiced by the Tsarist régime against its Polish subjects and the process of Sovietization applied today by Moscow through a Polish puppet régime. He traces the stages through which, since 1945, the cultural pressure for conformity to Soviet patterns has been tightened constantly. A report on "Tsarist and Soviet Diplomacy in China" sees only unchanging continuities and fails to come to grips in a meaningful way with the differences in policies.

A study by Frederick C. Barghoorn throws new light on the consolidation of Russian "supremacy" within both the Soviet Union and the Soviet-dominated bloc, and raises many interesting problems concerning the potentially self-limiting effect of Russian cultural nationalism in its extreme Soviet version. Like the symposium as a whole, his paper opens up significant lines of inquiry, rather than attempting to provide definite answers to basic and exceedingly complex questions.

The Russian Institute, Columbia University

PHILIP E. MOSELY

GHEORGHE, ION, *Rumäniens Weg zum Satellitenstaat*. Heidelberg: Karl Vowinckel Verlag, 1952. Pp. 444.

That Rumania's history between 1938 and 1945 was a tragic one there can be no doubt. But who was responsible for the tragedy? This contentious question has set Rumanian opinion in quite sharply defined camps. The present book of recollections and observations by a Rumanian general, who served during the war as military attaché and diplomatic representative in Berlin, represents one such camp.

As for virtually all Rumanians the ultimate menace was, of course, the Soviet Union. But the real objects of General Gheorghe's wrath are King Carol II, Mihai Antonescu, and the men who prepared the coup d'état of August 23, 1944. Carol is castigated for his corruption of Rumanian political life and even more for his utter failure to defend the territorial integrity of his country in the summer of 1940. Mihai Antonescu, Marshal Antonescu's Foreign Minister, is despised as a person and as a conniver against Germany. August 23 is seen as a black day, on

which an ally was betrayed and Rumania, through an utterly unwarranted expectation of Anglo-American assistance, was delivered to the Soviet Union.

If there is a hero it is Marshal Antonescu (for whom the author has much respect and who, in his view, correctly recognized the need of maintaining Rumania's eastern defenses as long as possible. But even the Marshal failed in his task: he lacked the strength to remain master of the domestic scene, a prerequisite for the continued prosecution of the war; nor was he able to arrange the only honorable alternative, an open withdrawal from the war in the manner of Finland.

With regard to Nazi Germany the author's position is somewhat equivocal. He deplores many of the Nazis' "excesses" and cites with approval Marshal Antonescu's statement that he was dealing with "a bunch of gangsters." Yet he feels that some combination of socialism with nationalism was the only solution to the crisis in Rumanian politics. He is aware that Germany's and Rumania's war aims were quite different. Rumania really had little ideological interest, but was concerned with recovering Bessarabia and with securing a position for retaking Northern Transylvania—the principal preoccupation of the Antonescu régime. On the other hand, Gheorghe makes a good deal of the fact that Rumania and Germany were comrades in arms and is deeply outraged by the manner in which Rumania switched sides.

It is probably impossible for one who was on the other side during the war, and who saw in August 23 a highly desirable event, to accept a number of the premises supporting the argument of this book. Still, it is a significant document. While much of the story is by now familiar, the book is valuable in presenting the particular point of view of a military man loyally in the service of a dictatorship in alliance with Hitler's Germany. It makes melancholy reading, however, and sharpens the question whether the present dark fate which has befallen Rumania could have been averted by any diplomatic or military decisions which were in the power of Rumanians to make.

Columbia University

HENRY L. ROBERTS

KLEIST, PETER, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin 1939-45. Aufzeichnungen von Dr. Peter Kleist*. Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1950. Pp. 344. DM 12.60.

This work records the observations and recollections of Dr. Kleist, covering the years 1939-45. It concentrates primarily on Russo-German relations and a critical exposition of Nazi policies in occupied Soviet territories.

Dr. Kleist was active in the diplomatic maneuvers which led to the Russo-German rapprochement in August, 1939. A cryptic telephonic instruction from von Ribbentrop on April 7 (immediately after the Polish acceptance of the Anglo-French guarantee) ordered Dr. Kleist to cultivate closer ties with a Russian attaché several days later. The latter, in the course of post-tea conversations, expounded the virtues and possibilities of an improvement in Soviet-German relations. In August, Dr. Kleist flew to Moscow with the Ribbentrop mission which negotiated and signed the unexpected non-aggression pact. After 1941, he was drawn into the *Ostministerium*, created to formulate the policies applied to the occupied areas of the USSR. In 1943, he served as the medium through whom the Soviet Union attempted to direct ostensible peace feelers towards the *Reich*, via Stockholm.

Dr. Kleist's work is divided into three relatively equal parts. The opening third deals with Russo-German relations between 1939 and 1941 and the crisis which led to war. His testimony further bolsters the impression gathered from other German

sources that von Ribbentrop and Hitler gambled wrongly on Britain's willingness to come to Poland's aid in 1939. The result was a World War instead of a localized conflict.

The second third of the text concentrates on Nazi policies in the occupied areas in Eastern Europe. Dr. Kleist vainly recommended that the Germans play the part of liberators, appealing to the latent hostility to communist rule in the USSR. If such a course had been followed in 1941, Dr. Kleist asserts, Germany could not have lost the war in Russia. Instead, German occupation policies repelled millions of potential friends. The first partisan forces were disappointed nationalists.

Dr. Kleist's work can serve as a signpost, directing attention to a neglected phase of World War II—the apparent readiness of millions of new or old Soviet citizens to welcome the German army as a liberating force. In it may be found an explanation of the pathological fears and quest for security evinced by the Soviet Union. Therein, also, may lie the way to victory in the event of a new war between East and West.

The last portion of Dr. Kleist's recollections are of prime importance regarding the Stockholm peace feelers of 1943. The intent and seriousness of these overtures remain wrapped in a mystery. Since Dr. Kleist never received the authority to express an official interest, as a spokesman of the *Reich*, the Soviet Union did not risk showing its hand without more positive assurances that a Russian offer would not be exploited in a hostile manner. After three attempts, the USSR, instead, became the host of American and British representatives in the first Moscow Conference.

An appendix of about 45 pages includes some interesting sources, a number of which are not readily available elsewhere. Among the latter are official instructions regarding German occupation policies and several manifestoes issued by the "Committee for the Liberation of the Russian People."

Montana State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

SIMA, HORIA, *Destinée du Nationalisme*. Paris: P. E. G., 1951. Pp. 227. 550 fr.

One of the most striking but not the least surprising phenomenon in post-war Europe has been the rapid revival of fascism. Along with the ever-increasing role of the former activists within the democratic framework of West European governments, a prolific upsurge of neo-fascist political theory is clearly discernible.

In his *Destinée du Nationalisme*, the former leader of the Rumanian Legionary Movement purports to embrace the whole panorama of "nationalism",¹ ostensibly to explain both its fundamentals and its "assets" in the West's struggle against Communism.

The author advocates an alliance with the West in which "nationalism" might serve as the ideological arm in the fight against Communism. Sima maintains that such an alliance is both desirable and unavoidable because the democracies are now passing through a great ideological crisis—the idea of liberalism having lost its hold on the masses—and because of historical accident their destiny, since 1945, is tightly linked with that of "nationalism."

While the author is silent concerning the atrocities committed against humanity by the former leaders of the "New Order" in Europe, he is quite vociferous in exalting the "positive" achievements of the nationalist states. The political and military defeat suffered by the nationalists was due, not so much to the overall

¹The term "nationalism" in this review is used synonymously with "fascism."

superiority of the Allies, but mainly to the confusion and lack of ideological clarity within their ranks. Sima advances the thesis that this ideological confusion resulted partly from the inability of the nationalist leaders to understand the difference between the concepts of "national" and "nationalism."

"National" and "nationalism," according to the author, represent two different stages in the life of a nation: one directed mainly towards the external world, towards the "epos," the other towards the internal world, towards the "ethos." While the former represents the phase of the geographical delimitation of nations, the latter failed to develop the cultivation of the inner world professed by "nationalism" and instead retrogressed into the "national" phase by manifesting distinctive ideas of *revanche* and territorial conquests. When, after having signed the Munich Agreement, Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia, he dispossessed the National Socialist Movement of its prestige of "great historical revelation." The Reich's ambitions of world domination were furthermore unmasked by Hitler's opposition to the development of those genuinely nationalist movements which had shown too much independence. However true this may be in the case of some nationalist movements, Germany's support of former General Ion Antonescu in his open fight against the extremist wing of the Iron Guard led by Horia Sima in January, 1941, was, contrary to the author's assertions, solely due to Hitler's recognition of the irresponsible character of the Sima-led faction of the Rumanian Legionary Movement.

In addition to the imperialism "inherited from the bourgeois-capitalist society" the nationalists' other monumental mistakes were to have acquired the totalitarianism of the Bolsheviks and the materialism exalted to an equal degree by both Capitalism and Communism.

Sima professes to have a panacea for the dissipation of the distrust disseminated by these historical "errors." Out of the spiritual and intellectual past of Europe, he disentangles three strands of vital importance for the destiny of our civilization: Christianity, Democracy and Nationalism. Whereas Democracy is but a technique for registering the opinion of citizens, Nationalism is a given reality—the spiritual state of a people which gradually reveals itself to consciousness. Democratic techniques and processes, viz., universal suffrage, parliament and law, are but instruments of the expression of this "invisible reality." The third element in the politico-historical synthesis, Christianity, transfigures these values by extending them into the realm of eternal verities.

Since in Sima's view, the Western Democracies have nothing to offer in opposition to Communism except the idea of unlimited economic prosperity, they will have to appeal to the experience and combat-effectiveness of the nationalist movements. Without the support of the spiritual *élan* of the nationalists, the military preparations and the rearmament efforts of the West are "doomed to failure."

While some of the critical observations relating to the spiritual and ideological impoverishment of the West are true, the remedy certainly does not lie in the acceptance of Sima's panacea. The West is indeed passing through a great political and social conflict, known in the Toynbeeian terminology as a "time of troubles." To respond successfully to the challenge of history the West must indeed revive the physical and spiritual creativity of the past and adapt them to a changing world. The ideals of freedom, religion and democracy—antithetical to both Communism

and "Nationalism"—are the time-tested pillars upon which the Western democracies can safely assert themselves.

New York City

RANDOLPH J. BRAHAM

DENNETT, RAYMOND and JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, *Negotiating with the Russians*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951. Pp. xi, 310.

This symposium provides a grim picture indeed. Actual participants in top-level and technical negotiations with representatives of the Soviet government report here on their experiences with considerable detail, and yet with the necessary perspective. From their different observation points, the authors, diplomats, military men, lawyers, government economists, university teachers—examine the whole negotiation process in its various aspects: the climate in which negotiation took place, the issues involved, the expected or hoped for results, the techniques and tactics of both sides, the reasons for agreement or disagreement, outcome of the conferences, and the consequences.

The important contribution made by this volume does not consist in startlingly new revelations, but rather in the way in which these accounts permit one to gauge the impact of what is known about the functioning of bolshevism on the business of diplomatic negotiations. That all Soviet "negotiators" are but the mouthpiece of the central government, that they are bound by rigid instructions to the point of making true "negotiating" impossible, that they constantly impute to their conference partners motives arising out of strictly marxist hypotheses, that they are utterly ignorant of the processes of democratic government—all that we have known before. But how these basic attitudes make some kind of negotiation absolutely impossible while limited successes can be scored in certain situations and regarding certain problems, makes for the interest of the symposium.

One may regret that some all-important negotiations are not covered, such as those in regard to Germany, reparations, the United Nations Charter, the peace treaties with the former satellites; all but the technical expert may wish for the shortening of certain accounts such as those on the Nürnberg trial and the Bretton Woods agreements. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the contributions make it possible to watch the behaviour of bolshevist leaders or their executants through the prisma of American observers of widely differing backgrounds and temperaments, makes the (carefully edited) volume both an exciting historical account and an indispensable guide for all possible future negotiation with the Kremlin, whatever its occupants may be.

The accounts cannot help but criticize some of the incredible naïveté the American side showed in many of the negotiations (though they also seem to clear from suspicion some top-flight American officials who have come in lately for much partisan blame). Several authors make the point that it has been one of our fundamental mistakes to reach with the Soviets "agreements in principle," leaving the details to further elaboration and not foreseeing that the Russians would turn those "details" into traps. What is further criticized (and this is often self-criticism of the contributors to the volume) is what one might term the "semantic" errors of the American negotiators who believed that such terms as "free elections" or "compromise" had the same connotation on both sides of the conference table.

Altogether the book conveys the clear lesson that in dealing with the Soviet Union there is no substitute for power, and that hence in the future the "building of strength and negotiating cannot be regarded as alternatives or opposites. . . .

Negotiation without strength and determination behind it is frustrating, dangerous and may be suicidal." (Mosely, p. 302). Yet the same author concludes (*ibid.*): "On the other hand when strength has been built, refusal to negotiate may precipitate a colossal struggle, which would be fought as a cruel civil war in many parts of the world—the very conflict which western strength is being fashioned to avert."

University of Colorado

HENRY W. EHLMANN

MALARA, JEAN and LUCIENNE REY, *La Pologne d'une occupation à l'autre* (1944-1952). Paris: Éditions du Fuseau, 1952. Pp. 371.

SMITH, C. A., ed., *Échappés du Paradis. Huit témoignages sur le communisme soviétique*. Paris: Éditions du Fuseau, 1952. Pp. 287.

Much has been written in the non-Communist world, since 1945, concerning the absorption of the Central European states into the Soviet orbit. The suddenness and frequent violence with which a whole group of peoples, almost notorious for their passionate nationalism, have suddenly been turned in the opposite direction, away from western liberal democracy with which their history and traditions have hitherto connected them, have excited at least the curiosity of students of European history and politics in an unusual degree. The case of Poland has been unusually intriguing. A people whose most bitter experiences have, for centuries, been with her eastern Slavic neighbor, now finds herself again a part of the Russian system, with a Russian marshal the head of the state, her army completely controlled by Russian officers, her social, economic and political machinery completely oriented toward Moscow, and, in every detail of life and thought, subject to Russian direction. The magnitude and intricacy of this phenomenon, amidst others of a similar pattern, has hardly been brought home to the western literate public.

In this study of the eight years of transition the authors set out to describe, in full and documented detail, the personalities involved, the procedures, the principles at stake, the results. It is not a polemic. It is much more devastating in its ultimate implications than if it were polemic in tone. Its very precision and general accuracy is its own gauge of effectiveness.

The scene is set at the end of 1943 when the Germans withdrew behind the 1939 boundaries and Russian policy toward the Polish anti-Nazi resistance began to come clear. Polish efforts to cooperate with the Russians resulted in the Russians disarming the Poles and forcing upon the country the "Committee of National Liberation," prepared in Moscow. From that moment to the end of 1952, the steps by which all Polish independence, of whatever color or political stripe, was liquidated, are traced in clear and specific detail. Obviously there are certain kinds of evidence no one but the participants in a secret decision can control. But the historian can trace the relation between the spoken word of responsible officials, their actions, and other facts which can have been effected only by their orders, and notice a consistent series of events. This analysis and tracing has been done in this study in a most convincing fashion. There are 80 pages of notes, mostly references to Polish Communist sources, which leave no doubt as to the authenticity of the presentation.

Tracing the liquidation of the several political groupings in Poland by means varying from enticing promises to physical elimination, the reader is led to the clear impression that from the beginning the Russian high command wanted to gain control of Poland in the cheapest possible way, by persuasion of gullible

middle-of-the-roaders or irreversible political chicanery until the machinery of the state was in their hands in so preponderant a measure that the die-hard resistance had either to flee or commit political suicide. The party itself, even the "United" Workers' Party, whose "union" represents political massacre, turns out to be of less import even than the parliament (Sejm) which has in fact only the dubious function of approving what has already been decided. The real power rests in the state apparatus, and this in turn is supported by the police power. It is interesting that the police force numbers 16 out of every 1,000 population, a portion identical with the number of political prisoners; one policeman to each prisoner. This proportion of police to population is roughly twenty times that in the western democracies. The latest change is the elimination from positions of power of any Polish communists. Those Poles remaining in any posts of responsibility are those Moscow trainees who have shown themselves completely obedient. The next step, obviously, will be the elimination from positions of any power of any Poles. This stage in the evolution of the once proud and independent state of Poland is already advanced. The "schisme de Gomulka," the six year plan, the class war among the peasantry, the russification of education, culture, art, industry and commerce, are all fitted into the total picture so as to show graphically how definitive the Soviet plan for Poland really is.

The eight accounts collected by Mr. Smith have as authors individuals who experienced "residence" in the Soviet Union for periods from two years to 11 years. Of quite different nationalities, from different professions, political persuasions and confessional connections, they never knew one another before their stories of life in and out of Soviet prisons were collected. The correspondence in detail as well as in general tone between all eight accounts is remarkable. There is much anecdote, but through such detail that is both authenticated and corroborated the reader can only too easily reconstruct the philosophy and policy which guide the directors of that policy. Each of the eight is vouched for by some eminent personality, now living in the free world, who knew the deponent before the war. The drab and bestial inhumanity that moves those who decree imprisonment and exile is difficult to understand, but the bitter reality is more than matched by the tenacity with which the survivors cling to their ideals of the dignity of the free human spirit.

University of Colorado S. HARRISON THOMSON

PENROSE, E. F., *Economic Planning for the Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. xiv, 384. \$7.50.

The title of this magnificent book conveys only imperfectly its contents. In addition to being a treatise on the wartime economic plans of the United Nations—notably Britain and the United States—for the post-war period, it contains a good deal of biographical material on some of the main policy-makers in the Allied war effort and a series of shrewd and pertinent observations on the role of experts in government service and the blunders that may ensue if genuine experts are not consulted. The work is thus not only of interest to students of economic planning in general, and wartime planning of the United Nations in particular, but it forms also a significant primary source for students of recent history.

Among the chief personalities on whose thought and actions some new light is shed are: Lord Keynes, Harry D. White, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Henry L. Stimson, Anthony Eden, and, above all, John Winant. Professor Penrose was economic advisor to Ambassador Winant during the war years. His great admiration and respect for Winant shines through most of the pages of the book; but Winant appears to have been equally appreciative of Professor Penrose's council, because

he was drawn into all, even the highest top-level, conversations and deliberations between the two major Western Allies. This makes Professor Penrose's book an unusually valuable source of these historical events. For he was an eye-witness at many vital conversations and saw the rough first drafts of many documents and dispatches of the utmost importance. And yet, since he was not in a final policy-making position, but essentially operated in an advisory capacity or as an intermediary, his book is neither a justification of one set of policies, nor an attack on another set, but a sane, sound, and impartial examination of all significant aspects of postwar economic planning of the United States and Britain.

I know of only one work which is somewhat similar in character: Herbert Feis' *Seen from E. A.* Mr. Feis, like Professor Penrose, served in the United States government as economic advisor, and his analysis of the expert's role and, above all, the expert's frequent frustrations, confirms what Professor Penrose says about this subject. The expert's troubles arise chiefly from the fact that simple straightforward policies which appear to have merit from a technical point of view cannot be put into practice because of opposite political considerations. This, in itself, is neither a new, nor a particularly singular experience. But what makes Professor Penrose's book most valuable is his description of several instances, notably the problem of postwar economic policy with regard to Germany, which provide vivid illustrations of the conflict between economic sense and alleged political necessity. In addition the peculiar difficulties imposed on the implementation of foreign economic policies by the division of powers in the American government are a further factor of confusion.

As Professor Penrose points out, for example, there were at one time four American policies on the postwar German economy. They were those of Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Hull. In addition the documents emanating from the State Department appeared to differ from Mr. Hull's views, and none of the four policies appeared to be workable in the long run or rigorously enforceable in the short run. Moreover, American views on postwar German economy differed profoundly from both British and Russian views. The story of attempts to iron out these differences, and the resulting contradictions and imperfections, are an instructive example of how the postwar generations may have to pay for the mistakes, lack of preparedness, and lack of unanimity of policy-makers in wartime.

The case of the treatment of Germany is only the most startling instance of how confusion compounded may lead to disastrous results. Other instances are the winding up of lend lease, the experience with UNRRA and others. Yet, it would be unfair to stress merely the cases in which success was lacking. Professor Penrose vividly describes also instances in which—perhaps because of the more vital participation of experts—agreement could be reached and a high degree of unanimity achieved. The outstanding example is perhaps the story of the discussions leading to the Bretton Woods Agreement and the subsequent setting up of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Considerations of space forbid the extensive discussion of other instances taken up by Professor Penrose. In all, the variety and importance of the problems he treats, the competence with which he discusses them, and the information he supplies, make this book one of the most significant sources on Allied postwar economic planning which have appeared so far.

University of Chicago

BERT F. HOSELITZ

OSTOVIĆ, P. D., *The Truth About Yugoslavia*, with an Introduction by Ivan Mestrovic. New York: Roy Publishers, 1952. Pp. 300. \$3.50.

HODGKINSON, HARRY, *Challenge to the Kremlin*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. 190. \$2.75.

The two books under review deal with different subjects; the first tries to enlighten the reader on modern history of Yugoslavia, the second is an analysis of the impact of Titoism on the Communist philosophy and policies. The only factor common to both is that they stem from the same ethnical milieu—the Yugoslav people. But already this aspect, as unimportant as it is for the consideration of these two works, indicates the difficulty of passing judgment on things Yugoslav. For as Ostović sees the picture of Yugoslav modern history through his idealizing glasses of a Croat, Hodgkinson admires Titoism as a typically Serbian phenomenon.

On matters of complex and passionate interpretation everyone seems to have his truth, and Ostović has his Croatian truth about Yugoslavia. In that sense it is a valuable balance to the Serbian truth about the history of their common country. The author is at his best in the first part of his book as he leads us through the intricacies of the national mosaic of the South Slavs and the making of the Yugoslav state. He claims rightly for his fellow countrymen, the Croats, the devotion and enthusiasm which they gave, before World War I, to the lofty ideal of a united Yugoslavia—a fact which is often ignored or underestimated by historians. He immediately slips, however, into the error of writing off the contribution in blood which the Serbs brought to the common struggle. It was a great disappointment to the Croats when they encountered in the newly-born Yugoslavia the spirit of Serbian prepotence and lust for hegemony. The inter-war Yugoslavia did not live up to their pre-war ideals, and soon after the liberation in 1918 they found themselves strangers in their own country. Small wonder that they were dissatisfied. But the cardinal question which imposes itself remains as to whether it was the right and only way to fight for their proper place in Yugoslav politics by crying over the injustices perpetrated by the Serbs in self-imposed isolation and defiance of Yugoslav laws. Ostović leaves the question unanswered, with the implication that the Serbs were responsible for all the misfortunes brought upon his country.

The author is vague and brief in the description of the situation in Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War and during the civil war in the country. As a Croat, always longing for the right place under the Yugoslav sun, he is impressed by Tito's slogan, "brotherhood and unity," overlooking, strangely enough for a democrat, the totalitarian imposition of brotherhood and unity upon the Yugoslav people—a method which can temporarily silence the voices of discontent but can never solve the Serbo-Croat problem permanently.

Hodgkinson's *Challenge to the Kremlin* follows the bold ambition of proving that the existence of Titoism has deeply affected the Soviet ideology and policy. As the author himself admits that "nothing is less rewarding than trying to discover the reasons for the break between Tito and the Cominform . . ." (p. 31), he bases his conclusions on uncertain grounds of speculation. He does so, however, with a sense of knowledgeable analysis and rich imagination, never in lack of thought-provoking ideas. It is only natural, then, if some of them are open to question.

Hodgkinson ascribes to the Serbs the privilege of history never repeating itself, "except when written in Serbian" (p. 37). He sees Serbian history as one chain of struggle for upholding a principle against any odds, and, passing through the national coup of March 1941, he finds Tito and Titoism at the culminating end

of this chain. This is, for him, a Serbian product. Facts would prove, however, that Tito and his Communist followers had nothing in common with the Serbian national uprising in 1941 and that his guerrillas were worst off in Serbia during the war. Tito cannot claim Serbian support for the happenings which brought him to power. Similarly, he cannot claim the support for his decision to oppose Moscow from anyone else than his disciplined Titoists. The Yugoslav people had no knowledge whatsoever about the fatal things which were under way before the rift was made publicly known—by Moscow, not by Belgrade.

Another important aspect of Hodgkinson's evaluation of background facts upon which he builds "his case" is his acceptance at face value of accusations which Moscow hurled at Tito and of the latter's answers. For him the conflict was long in the making, and Stalin had been for a long time suspicious of Tito. Does he not contradict himself, however, when he, correctly, states that "any open confession of errors by Tito may be good for the communist soul, but it is often fatal to the communist body" (p. 65). Tito's anti-western fury, pursued until 1948, would also deny validity to his reasoning that Tito did not see the division of the world as definitely as did Stalin.

Hodgkinson further deals with war-time problems as they affected Yugoslavia, with the Soviet-Yugoslav split as it is reflected in arts and sciences; he draws the parallel between Tito and Henry VIII. Whether right or wrong, he is always interesting and lively. But most provocative is his conviction that Tito's heresy and his alleged policy of liberalizing the régime in Yugoslavia are "the most formidable challenge that Soviet ideology had yet received" (p. 96). He states boldly that Stalin's articles on linguistics were a cover for a major crisis in Soviet ideology and internal politics; that they were meant as an answer to Tito's corrosive effect upon communist thinking. Accordingly, Stalin was put on the defensive and he was compelled (and now presumably his successor will be compelled) to follow a policy of peace. The world can look forward to the future. The Soviet leaders will not use the atom bomb as this would destroy the industrial centers of the western countries—the very basis of the envisaged Communist society. Nor can they any more hope that capitalist powers would exhaust each other in the old-fashioned imperialist wars (though Stalin's last study, published in October 1952, contradicts Hodgkinson's argument). For these reasons, and many others, they are heading for "co-existence." They must revise their own theory and practice. The world will witness material changes in the Soviet Union and it stands "on the threshold of an unprecedented period of peace," "unless it lost its head . . ." (p. 179). Is it possible that we have one man to thank for all these optimistic visions—the Communist Tito?

Reason would not allow a reaction to these monumental questions raised by Hodgkinson. The world scene changes quickly. Only the future will reveal whether the answers which he imaginatively and readily provides will have been justified. The credit of optimism is on his side; the burden of proof remains open. Experience would invite more caution.

University of Denver

JOSEF KORBEL

TITO, *Deset godina narodne revolucije: govori*, Belgrade: Kultura, 1951. Pp. 213.
KARDELJ, EDVARD, *Deset godina narodne revolucije, 1941-1951*, Belgrade: Kultura, 1951. Pp. 107.

The official views of Yugoslavia's Communist leaders regarding the events of the first decade following the aggression of Nazi Germany are conveniently sum-

marized in these two collections of formal pronouncements. The volume contributed by Tito includes eighteen speeches of unequal importance. Some of them are no more than brief talks at party functions in provincial towns, but a few represent more substantial statements of policy. Among the latter are Tito's address of December 21, 1951, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Yugoslavian People's Army, and his speeches at Titograd, Mostar, Uzice, and Rankovicevo. The account by Kardelj is more systematic, and was presented as a lecture before the third congress of the Liberation Front on April 27, 1951.

These two booklets review a crowded decade of Yugoslavian Communist policy, but overshadowing the accounts of wartime victories are the repeated references to more recent and dramatic events. The real interest of these pronouncements is their revelation of how Yugoslavia's leaders represent to their own elite the foreign and domestic policies of their country since the break with the Cominform. The central purpose of Tito in setting forth Yugoslavia's international position is to demonstrate that his people are not isolated. He asserts that although they hear much abuse of their country over the radio, ninety percent of this criticism comes from the Cominform countries and the rest is attributable to the Vatican. Tito contrasts the abuse received by Yugoslavia at the hands of the Soviet Union with the fair and equal treatment accorded by the Western democracies, and acknowledges the assistance in supplies and morale that the latter have provided. In further defense of Yugoslavia's developing relationship with the West, Foreign Minister Kardelj maintains that he is conducting the policy that will assure the maximum guarantee of his country's independence and security.

The controversy with the Soviet Union dominates equally the interpretation of domestic policy offered by Yugoslavia's leaders. "Bureaucracy" is the key word in the line of argument, and in explaining the hostility of the Cominform régimes Tito asserts that where the Soviet Union lays its bureaucratic hand democracy has no place and cannot exist." Similarly Kardelj, in a characteristic phrase, describes the Soviet elite as a "state-capitalistic bureaucratic caste." He pictures the Communist party as the main defense of Yugoslavia against foreign domination and exploitation, and describes its principal task as "the struggle against bureaucratism and for socialist democracy and popular self-government." In their development of a new variant of "socialist democracy" Yugoslavia's leaders can lay a certain claim to the originality, and Kardelj stresses the need to overcome the "reactionary factors" to which he attributes the failure of socialism in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Drawing on the writings of Marx and Engels, he argues at length for the decentralization of authority in the political and economic spheres as the essential prerequisite for the latest Yugoslavian experiment.

Candor is not a quality characteristic of official pronouncements, and much is left unsaid in these expositions by Tito and Kardelj. By understressing the helplessness of Yugoslavia's position after the break with the Cominform and misrepresenting somewhat the character of Western assistance, they are able to paint a far rosier picture of their régime than the facts warrant. Similarly in the domestic field they make much of the evils of Soviet "bureaucratism," but little is said of the ruthless tyranny and economic failures of their own administration. At the same time it should be recognized that since 1951 a serious effort has been made to reconsider domestic policies. The constitutional reform of January 13, 1953, and a series of recent changes in economic organization offer evidence of this trend,

although it is still too early to know what results this new experiment in "democratic socialism" may offer.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

DEDIJER, VLADIMIR, *Tito*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953. Pp. vii, 443. \$5.00.

"Soso has always been a good boy," said Stalin's mother in 1930 when her son was engaged in the process of mass extermination of Russian peasants. Vladimir Dediđer apparently has the same opinion about Tito. He lived in the United States for several years and learned well the journalist's profession of giving a human touch to his story. Accordingly, he pictures Tito as a man with humanitarian convictions, who developed from childhood a deep sense of justice and revolted against the old political and economic system. The story is clearly prepared for the climax: here is the hero of mankind, a man who will fight anybody, who would dare to stop its progress, a man who inevitably had to fight even against Stalin, "the good boy."

Tito's early years were filled with the common social troubles of his generation. We went from one job to another, had little education and even less bread. When he was eighteen he entered the Social Democratic Party and was active in local trade unions. In World War I, he was captured on the Russian front and spent several years wandering from one place to another in Russia as a prisoner-of-war. Many people see today in Titoism a product of Tito's strong national feelings, but it is strange then that one does not find in Dediđer's biography a single trace of Titoist nationalism until 1948, the break with Moscow. The national aspirations of his fellow countrymen prior to World War I passed him by; the struggle of the Yugoslav people for liberation was of no interest to him; he never mentioned his own country when in Russia during and after the war; and in the inter-war period he clearly served as an agent of the Comintern.

History-making events, such as the dissolution of four empires in 1918, and even the October Revolution, or the history-shattering philosophies of fascism and nazism found no evaluation in Tito's mind, at least not in this official biography, which is in many places presented in Tito's own words as an autobiography. Its authenticity is open to question in any event if one may judge from such unfortunate slips as when Tito narrates in 1942 that his grandchildren are among the great pleasures of his life—the children actually being born sometime around 1950.

Tito had his share in the Yugoslav Royal prisons and he is rightly bitter about their brutal methods of investigation. The former rulers of Yugoslavia have no reason to be proud of their political achievements and even less of their police system. But would the present ruler of Yugoslavia, Tito, allow his political opponents to organize strikes, to publish newspapers, and if in prison, to organize party cells in jail? He did all that under the Royal régime!

Tito was in the Soviet Union on several occasions, before, during, and after the war. He had profound doubts about the working of the Soviet Communist machinery, about the Comintern; he knew about the horrors of torture, massacres, and purges. Strangely enough, his humanitarian conscience did not bother him for years, and he praised democracy and freedom in the Soviet Union in many public statements. He makes his private reactions public in 1953 and explains his silence by "party discipline." Similarly, it is only now that he reveals that the conflict between Tito and Stalin dated back to 1942 and sharpened with each Tito victory

during the war. It would require an unlimited trust in the author's and his hero's integrity to believe that Stalin preferred King Peter to his own disciple.

The book throws little new light on the real reasons for the Moscow-Belgrade conflict. Tito's, Kardelj's, Djilas' and Koca Popovic's recounting of their conversations with Stalin and Molotov make interesting reading, but they do not create an impression of completeness. The general trend leads to the conclusion that the break was inevitable. Dedijer tries to forget (as the Western world has, in fact, forgotten) that Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were thrown out of the Cominform by Moscow, and he would like to present the story as if Tito left the Cominform spontaneously.

As has been the policy of Moscow for years, so Tito also identifies the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the Yugoslav people. To him there is no difference between the wishes of the Yugoslavs and the policy and aims of the party. Modesty has never been among the virtues of Yugoslav Communists, and Dedijer may consider it even an understatement if he compares Tito and George Washington as symbols of great revolutions (p. 417). If the Yugoslav Communists do possess a virtue it is one of courage. But then, is it not true that courage sometimes serves a bad cause?

Dedijer is a good writer. He treats the subject with deliberate simplicity to achieve convincing effects. He frankly acknowledges that he is biased and that is what his book should be taken for. He has become the official historiographer of the Yugoslav partisan movement and has now been elevated to the position of Official Biographer for Tito. One can only hope for him that future events will not compel him to rewrite his biography, as he was obliged to make changes in his *Dnevnik*. None of his works will be reliable sources for any future historian undertaking the task of writing a really unbiased book about Tito and Communist Yugoslavia.

University of Denver

JOSEF KORBEL

SHORTER NOTICES

TURNWALD, WILHELM, *Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen*. Munich: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen, 1952. Pp. 590.

The organization of Sudeten Germans who are responsible for the collection and publication of these documents hope thereby to further their plans for return to their former homes in Czechoslovakia. The Documents are statements by individual Germans of mistreatment they received at the hands of Czech soldiery or gendarmerie or of Russian troops at the time the country was liberated from German control, May 1945 and after. These statements make very unpleasant reading. There can be little doubt that the majority present a true or essentially true picture of the brutality incident to war. Stalin remarked to Beneš that his soldiers were not angels. A people who have suffered six years of spoliation and organized murder is not likely to behave angelically or even discriminatingly toward the people who have despoiled them. There is much that is not said in these reports—the origin of the German deponents, their "Haltung" during the occupation, their pre-1938 activity. I visited these areas in the summer of 1945 and witnessed some of the "Austreibung," but I heard none of these stories from Germans who were being evacuated. That does not mean these things did not happen. On the other hand I heard much open opposition to Czechs to the roughness with which the Germans were handled. I have not heard of any open or indeed covert criticism by Germans of their government's treatment of Czechs and Poles from 1939 to 1945. Such comparisons would appear to be relevant.

S. H. THOMSON

WOJCIECHOWSKI, Z. and M. SUCHOCKI, edd., *Studia Poznanskie*. Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1953. Pp. 499.

The editors of *Przegląd Zachodni* have devoted numbers 6-8 of volume 14 (1953) to a memorial volume on the 1000th anniversary of the founding (953) of the city of Poznan and the 700th anniversary of the receipt by the city of a formal *privilegium* from two Piast princes. The collection does not constitute a connected history of the city. Most space is devoted to the later period, but the article by W. Hensch, "Poznan, in antiquity and the early Middle Ages," (pp. 14-100) is almost an illustrated monograph in itself. I should have expected more on the period of the partitions, German possession and Napoleonic manipulation, but perhaps that could be regarded as so rich in material as to justify separate studies. The studies of Poznan under German Occupation (K. M. Pospieszalski) and the liberation of the city in 1945 (Zd. Grot) bring hitherto unpublished documents from the captured archives of the *Wehomacht*. It cannot be said that the German army was unsystematic in retreat and defeat.

P. W.

Mid-European Studies Center, *Mid-Europe. A Selective Bibliography*. New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, 1953. Pp. 197. \$1.20.

This is Publication No. 10 of the Mid-European Studies Center. It is professedly imperfect and selective. The critical and informed reader will certainly be annoyed by the collocation of trash with useful material, and the lack of bibliographical organization. It is indeed difficult to know on what basis or for what readers the titles were chosen. The expert will find it of little assistance; without careful guidance the student may be easily misled by it. The great majority of the titles are in English. A few, and they not by any means chosen for quality, are in German or French. A very few titles are in Central European languages, and they

are, on the average, far from being the more significant ones. The reader must get the impression that the compiler used the card files of the New York Public Library and that without knowing much about what was inside the books. We certainly need a selective bibliography of Central Europe. One could have been produced for the money invested in this compilation, but this is not it.

S. H. THOMSON

Young Communists in the USSR: A Soviet Monograph Describing the Demands Made Upon Members of the Komsomol Organization. Translated by Virginia Rhine. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Pp. 92.

Although there is nothing new or unexpected in this monograph translated from the Russian for the Current Soviet Thought Series of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, it serves a useful purpose by making available to the non-Russian reader documentation on the attitudes of Soviet Communism. It is an exhortation and instruction to members of the Komsomol, emphasizing the necessity for unquestioning devotion to the Soviet Motherland, the duty of leadership by precept and example of the less enlightened Russian youth, and the need for constant study and observance of "Marxist-Leninist Science."

The concluding paragraph is not unexpected: "All members of the Komsomol and every young man and woman in the Soviet nation are striving and must strive to be like Lenin and Stalin in everything and to follow their example in daily life and work."

R. B.

ZAJCHOWSKA, STANISŁAWA and MARIA KIELCZEWSKA-ZALESKA, edd. *Warmia i Mazury*, vol. IV of *Ziemia Staropolskie*, 2 vols. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1953. Pp. 407 and 379.

The series of monographs on ancient Polish lands (see this *Journal*, IX (1949), 247) edited by Professors Zd. Kaczmarczyk and Z. Wojciechowski, begun in 1947, now reaches seven volumes. The purposes of the editors, to familiarize Poles with the lands rejoined to the Polish *rzeczpospolita* since 1945, in as full and accurate a fashion as possible, would appear to be fairly successfully attained. Certainly the present study, concerned with Warmia (Ermeland) and Mazury (Masovia) has no difficulty in demonstrating the essentially Polish character of these areas. Even German historical maps allow Ermeland to be non-Teutonic through the centuries until the mid-eighteenth century. The post-world war I plebiscite in Oldsztyń (Allenstein) and Marienburg (Malbork), shamefully mismanaged by the Allied powers, ill concealed the Polish character of the population.

These two volumes, richly illustrated and well furnished with maps, cover the fields of prehistory (archeology), literature, church history and architecture, and political and folk-history. There are a number of fine pictures of the headquarters castle of the Teutonic Order at Malbork, but none of them shows the handsome building as it was after the Russian artillery had left its mark on a building which, as an unoccupied museum, had no military significance whatever. The natives called it a part of the latest five-year plan.

T.

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